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ABSTRACT
Architectural Support for Enhancing Security in Clusters. (August 2008)
Man Hee Lee, B.E., Kyungpook National University;
M.E., Kyungpook National University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Eun Jung Kim
Cluster computing has emerged as a common approach for providing more comput-
ing and data resources in industry as well as in academia. However, since cluster
computer developers have paid more attention to performance and cost efficiency
than to security, numerous security loopholes in cluster servers come to the forefront.
Clusters usually rely on firewalls for their security, but the firewalls cannot prevent
all security attacks; therefore, cluster systems should be designed to be robust to
security attacks intrinsically.
In this research, we propose architectural supports for enhancing security of clus-
ter systems with marginal performance overhead. This research proceeds in a bottom-
up fashion starting from enforcing each cluster component’s security to building an
integrated secure cluster. First, we propose secure cluster interconnects providing con-
fidentiality, authentication, and availability. Second, a security accelerating network
interface card architecture is proposed to enable low performance overhead encryption
and authentication. Third, to enhance security in an individual cluster node, we pro-
pose a secure design for shared-memory multiprocessors (SMP) architecture, which
is deployed in many clusters. The secure SMP architecture will provide confidential
communication between processors. This will remove the vulnerability of eavesdrop-
ping attacks in a cluster node. Finally, to put all proposed schemes together, we
propose a security/performance trade-off model which can precisely predict perfor-
iv
mance of an integrated secure cluster.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Widespread use of cluster systems in a diverse set of applications has spurred sig-
nificant interest in designing such servers, considering performance, scalability, and
Quality-of-Service. However, cluster computer developers have paid more attention to
performance and cost efficiency than to security. As a result, numerous security loop-
holes in cluster servers come to the forefront and consequently the design of secure
clusters has recently surfaced as a critical issue. Generally, any computer security
needs to offer three basic services: confidentiality, authentication, and availability.
Confidentiality refers to restricting access to data sent by a sender only to a des-
ignated receiver. Authentication allows the receiver to make sure that the received
message is authentic, not modified or forged. Availability refers to providing the
timely and reliable accesses to data and information services for authorized users [1].
Clusters usually rely on firewalls to defend against security attacks from the outside,
not providing any security measures within clusters. However, such protecting sys-
tems themselves are vulnerable to security attacks [2, 3] and, more realistically, weak
legitimate user passwords can be an open door to cluster systems at any time [4].
Therefore, it is desirable to design secure clusters which are robust to security attacks
intrinsically.
The easiest way to block hackers is to isolate clusters physically as some gov-
ernment and military agencies do but this cannot be a general solution. Enforcing
functionalities of firewalls can be a common method but it is out of scope of this
research. Security of cluster systems can be enhanced in many other ways. For exam-
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2ple, using secure OS like SELinux, removing buffer overflows of server applications, or
partitioning cluster nodes into several groups logically with different root privileges
can improve cluster security. Among many possible approaches, we mainly focus
on encrypting and/or authenticating communicating data. This approach is helpful
especially when cluster interconnects which are previously used to connect enclosed
cluster nodes are extended to connect external systems located outside a cluster as
demontrated in Supercomputing Conference 2005 where multiple clusters and storage
systems were connected through a cluster interconnect [5]. In this environment, the
cluster nodes are liable to security attacks through the extended cluster interconnects.
Encryption and authentication will prevent eavesdropping of data and passwords and
block unauthorized access to cluster nodes which are exposed to outside of a cluster.
Its major challenge is to minimize performance degradation while providing se-
curity transparency at the same time. Software or OS based security enhancements
cannot accomplish this goal because such schemes will deteriorate the overall cluster
performance by taking up a great amount of host processors’ computing resources.
Furthermore, if OS or a user application has to be involved in security provisioning
deeply, significant code modification should be made, especially causing great dif-
ficulties to legacy applications. Therefore, our main focus lies in designing secure
cluster communication to be as transparent to applications as possible by integrat-
ing additional hardware and by amending cluster interconnect protocols. The more
transparent security will help our schemes to be adopted to clusters more seamlessly.
In addition, hardware-supported security measures can incur less performance over-
head since most security operations will be done in hardware, not consuming host
processors’ computing power.
Major components we will consider are cluster interconnect protocols, cluster
interconnects cards (CICs), and computing nodes with multiple processors. This
3proposed research proceeds in a top-down fashion starting from proposing a secure
cluster design to enforcing each component’s security.
First, for secure cluster protocols, a handful of research groups have tried to
enhance cluster security in [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. However, a comprehensive approach
covering all three security services was not proposed. Especially, to the best of our
knowledge, there has been no previous studies investigating a comprehensive frame-
work for security enhancement in InfiniBand Architecture (IBA), a promising I/O
communication standard positioned for building clusters and System Area Networks
(SANs) [12]. In this research, we will point out security vulnerabilities of IBA and its
potential threats. Then we will present an authentication and encryption method to
remove those vulnerabilities with marginal performance degradation. Furthermore,
we will propose a mechanism to block denial of service (DoS) attacks in IBA.
Second, in order to provide high speed security services, it is necessary to imple-
ment security functionalities in CIC. Moreover, recent clusters are capable of user-level
communication (ULC), allowing user applications to bypass OS for communications,
so most cluster communications are already being processed by CIC. This makes it
almost impossible for host processor(s) to encrypt/decrypt or authenticate all cluster
communications without substantial performance degradation. To solve this problem,
we propose a CIC architecture enabling high performance secure clusters by means
of security hardware in CIC.
Third, as shared memory multiprocessor (SMP) systems are expected to be more
common in cluster systems, the communication between processors also needs to be
secure for a cluster node’s high-level security. A small body of literature already
investigated secure multiprocessor designs [13, 14] focusing on bus-based SMP sys-
tems; however, there has been no encompassing study taking into account other types
of SMPs with different network topologies. Our research proposes an Interconnect-
4Independent Security Enhanced Shared Memory Multiprocessor Systems (I2SEMS)
for inter-processor communication security. By integrating an additional cache in each
processor and a system-wide encryption/decryption controller, I2SEMS will keep all
data outside processors encrypted. Since we decouple the design of I2SEMS from
processor interconnecting topology, I2SEMS can be applied to any types of SMP
systems.
5CHAPTER II
SECURITY BACKGROUND
Since we will address classical security services, in this section we briefly introduce
the security services and common approaches related to our ideas.
A. Confidentiality
Confidentiality refers to restricting access to the data sent by a sender only to the des-
ignated receiver. Encryption and decryption will be needed to enforce confidentiality.
Encryption scrambles the original plaintext into ciphertext using an encryption key;
while decryption recovers the original plaintext from the ciphertext using a decryption
key. If the two keys are identical, this is called a symmetric or secret key mechanism.
Otherwise, it is called an asymmetric or public key mechanism, where anyone can
encrypt a message using a public key, but only the person with the private key can
decrypt it [15].
Block ciphers and stream ciphers are two basic symmetric encryption schemes.
Among them we chose to use the block cipher because block ciphers usually operate
on large blocks of data while stream ciphers do it on individual plaintext digits with
time-varying transformation.
In our research, we use Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as a basic block
cipher due to its security strength and recent research on fast hardware implemen-
tation [16]. Block ciphers can operate in several modes. The most basic mode is
Electronic Code Book (ECB). In ECB, a plaintext is split into several blocks and
each block is encrypted separately. With a fixed key and n-bit block cipher, this
mode is a sort of code book to map an n-bit string to another n-bit string. ECB
mode using AES is decribed in the following equation when AES and AES−1 are
6encryption and decryption functions, respectively.
ciphertext = AES(plaintext,Key)
plaintext = AES−1(ciphertext,Key)
Since it does not need any initial vector, it has no initialization overhead. In addition,
it is parallelizable in that each encryption solely depends on the input plaintext and
the key. However, ECB is a little vulnerable because it does not hide traffic patterns.
Even though encrypted data is still secure, the patterns may be further exploited
by a hacker. To solve this problem, feedback or chaining modes like Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC), Output Feed-Back (OFB), and Cipher Feed-Back (CFB) are used.
The result of the previous block is fed-back or chained into the next block. While it
has the initialization overhead and the parallelization restriction, it can successfully
hide patterns in the original plaintexts.
Note that a main limitation of the above methods especially like ECB is that the
whole AES function is in the critical path because the function can start only after
the plaintext or the ciphertext is available.
Counter (CTR) mode can solve the problem since the input of encryption func-
tions is not a plaintext nor a ciphertext, but just a counter. An encryption function
encrypts this counter to generate an encrypted counter, often called a keystream∗.
This keystream is XORed with a plaintext to make a ciphertext. Decryption should
use the same counter to generate the same keystream. This keystream is XORed with
the ciphertext to recover the original plaintext. Since CTR mode does not have any
dependence, parallelism or pipelining can improve cipher operation throughput. Its
∗Also known as one-time-pad (OTP) in previous literature.
7operation is decribed in the following equation.
chipertext = plaintext ⊕ AES(counter,Key)
plaintext = chipertext ⊕ AES(counter,Key)
The counter does not need to be secret because, even though an attacker gets
both a ciphertext and its counter, it is practically impossible to recover its original
plaintext without the secret key. The biggest benefit of this scheme is that AES
latency can be out of the critical path because it is possible to precompute keystreams
even when plaintexts or ciphertexts are not available. However, it is imperative to use
distinct counters for different plaintexts to prevent security vulnerabilities. Suppose
E1 and E2 are two different ciphertexts using the same counter C. If a hacker gets
these two ciphertexts and XOR them, he will get partial information of two original
plaintexts by clearing out the keystream, as described in the following.
E1 = D1 ⊕ AES(C,Key)
E2 = D2 ⊕ AES(C,Key)
E1 ⊕ E2 = D1 ⊕ D2
B. Authentication
Authentication allows two parties to agree that a received message is authentic, not
modified or forged. Message Authentication Code (MAC) is commonly used. Since
MAC is created and verified with the same secret key, communication parties should
share the key beforehand. Among several MAC schemes, keyed hash functions and
8block cipher-based MACs are widely used. In the keyed hash MAC, a hash function
maps a variable size message into a fixed length of digest. By digesting the message
along with a secret key, the hash function makes an authentication tag. If the receiver
has the same secret key, the receiver can make the same authentication tag. In the
block cipher-based MAC, the authentication tag is the output of the last cipher block
after encrypting the whole message. Well-known keyed hash MACs are HMAC-MD5
and HMAC-SHA1 [17, 18]. CBC-MAC and PMAC are examples of block cipher-based
MAC [19, 20, 21, 22].
GCM is a block cipher mode of operation that encrypts and authenticates mes-
sages at the same time, and also called authenticated encryption [23]. Detailed ap-
plication of GCM in our research are in Chapter V.
C. Availability
Availability refers to the ”timely and reliable access to data and information services
for authorized users” [1]. Availability has become more important in the Internet
because of the increase in DoS attacks. Early DoS attacks dumped huge numbers
of packets on a specific target system greatly slowing down the system and its net-
work [24]. While recent DoS attacks staged by worms or viruses often do not target
a specific system, they are still tying up infected or attacked systems and network
resources [25, 26, 27]. The defense against DoS attacks is processed as follows: First a
monitoring function detects a DoS attack; Second, when source addresses are spoofed,
a source identification function, if available, tracebacks true attacking systems; Third,
an access control is then applied to block the DoS attacks. In our research, we will
propose an efficient blocking scheme to block a type of DoS attacks in IBA.
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SECURE INFINIBAND CLUSTER∗
A. Introduction
Computer clustering is a popular trend in academia as well as in the industry for high
performance and high availability computing. Widespread use of cluster systems in
a diverse set of applications has spurred significant interest in designing such servers,
considering performance, scalability, and Quality-of-Service. However, cluster com-
puter developers have paid more attention to performance and cost efficiency than
to security. As a result, numerous security loopholes of cluster servers have been
revealed and consequently the design of secure clusters has recently surfaced as a
critical issue.
The easiest way to protect clusters is to isolate them physically, like some gov-
ernment and military agencies do, but this cannot be a general solution. Instead,
reinforcing firewalls can be a common method, but it is well known that firewalls
cannot prevent all possible threats. First of all, firewalls are useless to prevent inside
attacks [28]. Also, firewalls scan only certain layers; therefore, there always exist
potential attacks using upper layers. In addition, firewalls themselves have security
vulnerabilities or can be mis-configured to operate improperly. The followings are
such examples. Geer reported that several products of well-known security com-
panies such as Check Point Software Technologies, Symantec, and Zone Labs had
potentially dangerous flaws that could allow hackers to gain control of systems, dis-
∗Reprinted with permission from “A Comprehensive Framework for Enhancing
Security in InfiniBand Architecture” by Manhee Lee and Eun Jung Kim, 2007. IEEE
Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems (TPDS), Vol. 18, No. 10, pp.
1393-1406, Copyright 2007 IEEE.
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able computers, or cause other problems [2]. Wool quantified configuration errors of
firewalls installed on several sites. He found that many sites had serious configura-
tion errors and, for example, almost 80 percent of firewalls allowed any service and
insecure access to firewalls, which are not desirable for high security [3].
Besides improving the strength of firewalls, security of cluster systems can be
enhanced in many other ways. For example, using secure operating systems (OS)
like SELinux, preventing buffer overflows of server applications, or partitioning clus-
ter nodes into several logical groups with different root privileges can improve clus-
ter security. Among many possible approaches, we focus on secure communication
by encrypting/authenticating communication data. Protecting communication data
prevents potential eavesdropping on data and passwords and unauthorized accesses
to cluster nodes. This approach will help to build secure cluster systems especially
when cluster interconnects, which are previously used to connect enclosed cluster
nodes, are being extended to connect external systems located outside the cluster,
as demonstrated in Supercomputing Conference 2005 where multiple clusters and
storage systems were connected through a cluster interconnect [5]. In this environ-
ment the cluster nodes are liable to security attacks through the extended cluster
interconnects.
We can provide secure communication in two ways: software-based or hardware-
based. However, software-based security enhancements cannot be proper solutions in
cluster systems where high performance is a primary goal because such schemes will
deteriorate the overall cluster performance by taking up a great amount of computing
resources of host processors. Furthermore, if the OS or a user application needs to be
deeply involved in the security, significant code modifications are necessary, especially
posing great difficulties to legacy applications. However, hardware-supported security
measures imposes little performance overhead since most security operations will be
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done in hardware, not consuming host processors’ computing power. In addition, the
secure cluster communication provided in the cluster interconnect protocol level will
be transparent to applications, resulting in seamless adoption of secure communica-
tion. Therefore, our challenge is to minimize performance degradation and maximize
security transparency while providing secure communication in cluster.
There are several widely used cluster interconnects. Myrinet, proposed in 1995,
is a switching network with low latency cut-through switches [29]. As of November
2006, 15.8% of the Top 500 supercomputers use Myrinet. Quadrics has been the
interconnect of choice for high-end supercomputers. As of November 2006, 2.8% of
supercomputers are using products from Quadrics. Following the success of Eth-
ernet as a local area network, Gigabit Ethernet is making another success in high
performance computing area; currently, 42.6% of supercomputers are using Gigabit
Ethernet. InfiniBand Trade Association, an industry consortium, is leading the spec-
ification of IBA [12]. IBA is a promising I/O communication standard positioned
for building system area networks that are used in clusters, multiprocessor systems,
and storage area networks. User-level communication mechanisms in IBA improve
overall system performance significantly by reducing the communication overhead of
the operating system in message transfer. Among these cluster interconnects, we
investigate security of IBA since it has potential security vulnerabilities due to lack
of security considerations in the current specifications. In addition, an increasing
number of sites are constructing IBA cluster systems. As highlighted in the recent
Top 500 supercomputer list, the number of IBA cluster has been doubled from 36 to
78 in six months. This trend is expected to continue for IBA to overtake Myrinet.
The main contribution of this study is to investigate the following security issues
for providing a comprehensive framework for security enhancement in IBA clusters.
First, we point out security vulnerabilities of IBA and its potential threats. By sim-
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ulating a DoS attack inside an IBA cluster, we show that DoS attacks can degrade
clusters’ communication performance by up to two orders of magnitude. Second, we
present secret key management schemes which can be tightly coupled with the exist-
ing IBA key management and describe how to distribute the keys in IBA securely.
Third, we introduce the scalable adoption of an authenticated encryption scheme,
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), into IBA with only minor modifications to the IBA
specifications [23]. Finally, for better availability, we propose a stateful ingress fil-
tering to block one kind of DoS attack with invalid IBA Keys and scalable packet
marking algorithms to identify the location of the attackers. Since our scheme filters
ports related to only active DoS attacks instead of all ports, it incurs no performance
overhead in a normal situation. This dynamic filtering scheme is further enhanced by
making it robust to spoofing attacks with fake source addresses. Our scalable packet
marking algorithms can trace real attackers regardless of routing algorithms in huge
regular networks.
We use a comprehensive cycle accurate simulation testbed for IBA [30]. Simula-
tion results of a 16-node IBA network show that security performance overhead due
to encryption/authentication on network latency is 12.4% for 64 byte long packets.
When the packet length increases, the overhead decreases to as low as 0.7% with 1024
bytes long packets.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: We briefly introduce related
work and IBA in section B and C. In section D, we elaborate on security vulnerabil-
ities of the current IBA after introducing security background. Section E presents a
comprehensive framework to enhance IBA security, and its security and performance
are analyzed in section F and G, followed by the concluding remarks of this study in
section H.
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B. Related Work
There has been some research to improve security inside clusters. Yurcik et al. in-
troduced a new concept called emergent security properties to identify security char-
acteristics unique to clusters, which can be used to develop a unified monitoring tool
for clusters [6]. Pourzandi et al. proposed a new security model called the distributed
security infrastructure [8]. It supports a fine-grained cluster-wide security enforce-
ment on distributed applications by providing a process-level resource and access
control [7]. Foster et al. proposed a communication library allowing programmers
to communicate securely in geographically distributed computing environments [9],
which suitably provides well-organized security in Grid. Connelly and Chien focused
on incorporating confidentiality in remote procedure calls in tightly coupled applica-
tions. They applied traditional security functions such as transposition, substitution,
and data padding on the marshalling layer [10]. Their performance analysis showed
that encryption can be used in clusters with a minimal performance impact. Dim-
itrov and Gleeson presented security enhancement methods at three levels: network
host interfaces, system area networks, and communication protocols [11]. Their ap-
proach is systematic enough to be considered as a guideline for enhancing security of
Myrinet- or VIA-based clusters, but it is not compatible with the most recent IBA
specification. Overview of various cluster interconnects and their security issues are
well described in [31].
C. InfiniBand Architecture
In this section we introduce some features of InfiniBand architecture relevant to our
security enhancement in IBA. IBA is a high-speed switched interconnect connecting
end nodes such as processor nodes, I/O units, or routers to build clusters and system
14
area networks. An IBA consists of one or more subnets and each subnet is a set of
end nodes, switches, and its common subnet manager (SM). A channel adapter (CA),
similar to a network interface card, connecting a processor node or an I/O node to
the IBA network is called a host channel adapter or a target channel adapter. One
or more ports in a CA can be connected to the IBA fabric through serial links. IBA
links provide various speeds from 2.5 Gbps up to 120 Gbps.
Queue-Pair (QP) is a pair of work queues, a send queue and a receive queue, for a
consumer (or a process). When a consumer wants to send data to another consumer, a
send request is queued up to the send queue and its CA executes the request by getting
data from the user memory and sending them to the other consumer’s receive queue.
According to connection and acknowledgment modes, a QP is categorized as one of
five types: reliable connection, unreliable connection, reliable datagram, unreliable
datagram, and raw datagram. While a connection-oriented QP can communicate
with its connected QP only, a datagram QP can communicate with multiple datagram
QPs. A reliable QP provides the acknowledgment service guaranteeing the in-order
communication without error or duplication. Since the raw datagram is designed to
interact with non-IBA components, it is not our focus.
Among many features of IBA, Management, Partition, and Key are closely re-
lated to our design for security enhancement in IBA. First, an SM manages a subnet
by configuring and managing routers, switches, and CAs in the subnet. Each node
should have a subnet management agent to communicate with the SM. Second, IBA
Keys are used to provide isolation and protection. Currently five types of IBA Keys
are specified as follows: Management Key (M Key), Baseboard Management Key
(B Key), Partition Key (P Key), Queue Key (Q Key), and Memory Key (L Key and
R Key). The usage of each Key is summarized in [32].
A packet carries one or more IBA Keys and the receiving CA compares the
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delivered Keys with the stored Keys in the CA. If the two are identical, the packet
can access the node’s resource, but if not, the packet is discarded. Third, a partition is
defined as a collection of CA ports that can communicate with each other to provide
the exclusive resource sharing. Partition is managed by a partition manager, but
since the partition manager is usually a function of SM, in this paper we consider
that the SM manages partitioning.
D. Security Threat in IBA
In this section, we describe assumptions of our research and point out IBA security
vulnerabilities and their potential attacks which motivated our research.
1. Basic Assumptions
Before identifying and solving security vulnerabilities of IBA, we assume the following
constraints:
• CA/switch/router can be compromised.
• each of those devices has a tamper-resistant storage, the contents of
which cannot be read or modified from outside the device. The contents
are only accessible by its subnet manager with a legitimate key.
• attacking traffic can have spoofed source addresses.
2. Vulnerabilities and Threats
a. Confidentiality
Since IBA does not provide any encryption and decryption method, eavesdropping
attacks with help from compromised switches and CAs will succeed in acquiring
16
all communicating data. We call this Type I attack. This vulnerability is critical
especially when a cluster processes classified data.
b. Authentication
A resource to be protected has its own Key such as P Key or L Key and R Key. Any
captured packets which carry legitimate Keys will expose these plaintext Keys and
allow a hacker to generate illegal traffic with the Keys, referred to as Type II attack.
If this illegal traffic is using fake source addresses, it will be hard to find which port
the attacker is attached to. We classify this attack as Type III attack.
c. Availability
An attacker who does not even know any legitimate Key can stage a DoS attack by
sending tremendous traffic to a victim node. Although the traffic will be discarded at
the victim nodes because of the illegal Key, the traffic can affect other normal traffic
when it passes through the network. We define this attack as Type IV attack.
3. A Simulation of a DoS Attack
To show the impact of the DoS attack, we simulate a DoS attack on an IBA testbed.
We partition 16 nodes of the IBA network into four partitions and choose attacker
nodes randomly. The attacker nodes randomly select victim nodes and generate
illegal traffic at their full speed (2.5 Gbps, 1X IBA link). Other non-attacker nodes
communicate with each other in the same partition. Our simulation uses two kinds of
traffic: real-time and best-effort. Real-time traffic is injected at a fixed rate and has
a higher priority than best-effort traffic in intermediate switches. By using best-effort
attacking traffic, we can see its effect on real-time traffic and on other best-effort
traffic.
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(a) Real-time traffic (b) Best-effort traffic
Fig. 1. Average end-to-end latency under DoS attacks. We simulate DoS attacks on
our IBA testbed to estimate their effect on the overall network performance.
The latencies of real-time and best-effort traffic are increased by 6 and 18 times,
respectively. This shows that the number of attackers increases, the average
network latencies will increase significantly.
Fig. 1(a) shows how real-time traffic is affected by illegal best-effort traffic. With
no attacker, the average end-to-end latency is around 20 µs. The figure clearly shows
that the latency could increase by as much as 50 µs when even one attacker dumps
traffic. As more attackers are added, the average latency increases up to 120 µs.
Fig. 1(b) shows how illegal best-effort traffic degrades other legal best-effort traffic.
Its average latency increases more dramatically than that of real-time traffic. This is
because real-time traffic has a higher priority than best-effort traffic.
E. Security Enhancement in IBA
Security vulnerabilities are inevitable as long as IBA packets continue to carry plain-
text IBA Keys for their access control. To remove such vulnerabilities, we propose
that IBA use traditional cryptographic methods. Our main goal is to integrate en-
cryption and authentication into IBA not only with minor modifications to the IBA
specification but also with only marginal performance overhead. For this, new crypto-
graphic keys in addition to IBA Keys are necessary. Therefore, we first propose new
18
key management schemes to manage and distribute the keys. Based on these key
management schemes, we describe how GCM can be integrated into IBA and then
propose an efficient mechanism to block DoS attacks and a scalable packet marking
scheme to trace back DoS attacks which use fake source addresses.
1. Secret Key Management in IBA
To provide any security service, it is mandatory to have an efficient and secure key
management scheme. Since the existing key management of the current IBA is not
designed for security, we propose two new key management schemes: partition-level
and QP-level key managements. The partition-level key management enforces that all
communications inside a partition use the same secret key. This scheme ensures that
data communications are secure against attacks by a hacker located in a different
partition. This is simple to implement because each CA only has to maintain the
same number of secret keys as partition keys. However, this scheme is vulnerable
to security attacks originating from the same partition. To remove this problem, we
propose to use the QP-level key management for finer-grained security. Since QP
is the smallest communication entities, the QP-level key management will guarantee
confidentiality and integrity for all QP communications. Both management schemes
can be adopted into IBA without significant changes in the specification. We choose
the symmetric key mechanism for better performance.
a. Partition-Level Key Management
In this key management, a secret key will be created and assigned to each partition.
All components in each partition like switches and CAs should have its secret key.
The secret key is used to make an MAC and encrypt every packet transferred within
the partition. Even though P Keys are still available in packets, the exposure of
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the P Keys does not pose any further threats since the encryption/authentication
relies on its secret key, not on the P Keys. Therefore, even if an attacker captures
IBA packets, he cannot make legitimate packets with the captured P Keys because
the attacker does not know their secret keys. This partition-level key management
removes the aforementioned Type I and II attacks coming from different partitions.
There are several advantages of this scheme. First, every IBA packet should
carry a partition key while other IBA Keys may not be carried, so it is easy to
enforce security throughout the network. Second, since the number of partitions are
often small, the number of secret keys will not be so large, thus requiring a small
amount of space for the key management. Last, this key management makes use of
the well-defined key management mechanisms of IBA by adding one more column into
the existing Key tables. The current IBA key management, therefore, can successfully
manage new secret keys along with its IBA Keys. However, this key management has
a disadvantage in that it cannot block attacks originating from the same partition.
This is because CAs automatically decrypt and authenticate incoming packets as long
as the packets have the same P Key as the CA.
b. Queue Pair-Level Key Management
In order to remove aforementioned threats inside the partition, we alternatively pro-
pose Queue Pair (QP)-level key management scheme; two connection-oriented QPs
share a temporary secret key, referred to as a session key, and a connectionless QP
has its own secret key that can be sent to other connectionless QPs. There are two
benefits by implementing the QP-level key management. One is that even in the same
partition Type I and II attacks are not viable without a legitimate QP secret key. The
other benefit is that it also removes additional threats resulting from the exposure of
other IBA Keys. For example, even if an R Key is exposed to a hacker, he cannot
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access the corresponding remote memory without the QP’s secret key. Therefore,
QP-level key management provides fine-grained key management enough to secure
all communications in IBA.
c. Initial Key Distribution
To use the aforementioned key management schemes, it is necessary to distribute
secret keys securely. We first define two basic keys, a CA secret key (CA SK) and an
SM secret key (SM SK), on which subsequent key distributions depend. A CA SK
is a unique secret key assigned to each CA by its manufacturer and stored in each
CA’s tamper-resistant storage.† A manufacturer passes this key oﬄine, assumed to
be secure, to an IBA cluster administrator. Therefore, since the administrator has
all secret keys of CAs in the cluster, he can access any CA using the CA’s secret key.
The other basic key, SM SK, is assigned to each subnet by the administrator and
stored in SM’s CA. Then, the SM distributes its secret key to all CAs in its subnet
as follows:
(1) SM sends SM SK to all CAi in the subnet:
ECA SKi(SM SK)
(2) CAi decrypts SM SK:
SM SK = DCA SKi(ECA SKi(SM SK))
Note that MAC is not described for simplicity and EK(T) and DK(T) represent
that a plaintext, T, is encrypted and decrypted by a secret key, K, respectively. Since
the SM SK is encrypted using the receiving CA’s secret key, the distribution is secure.
The decrypted SM SK is stored in each CA. One concern in storing the SM SK in
†All the following secret keys will be stored in this storage, too.
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CAs is that a non-SM node might use the SM SK inappropriately. Therefore, each
CA needs to be hardwired so as not to decrypt or authenticate normal packets using
the SM SK. If there are multiple subnets in an IBA network, each subnet has its own
SM SK, and SMs should communicate securely with each other. For this purpose,
the administrator defines a shared SM secret key, SSM SK, to be shared by all SMs.
d. Partition-Level Key Distribution
In the partition-level security, a partition secret key, P SK, is created and distributed
as follows:
(1) SM sends P SK to all CAs in the subnet:
ESM SK(P SK)
(2) CAi decrypts P SK:
P SK = DSM SK(ESM SK(P SK))
When a partition is created across several subnets, one SM transfers the P SK to
other SMs to distribute it inside their own subnets.
(1) SM sends P SK to all SMs in other subnets:
ESSM SK(P SK)
(2) SMj decrypts P SK:
P SK = DSSM SK(ESSM SK(P SK))
(3) SMj sends P SK to CAi in the subnet:
ESMj SK(P SK)
(4) CAi decrypts P SK:
P SK = DSMj SK(ESMj SK(P SK))
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From now on all communications inside the partition can be encrypted and authen-
ticated by P SK.
e. Queue Pair-Level Key Distribution
For QP-level security, there are two secret key setup processes depending on the type
of communication. When a consumer wants a connection-oriented communication,
the source CA creates a session key randomly and then sends a request message
(REQ) containing the session key to a destination CA. If the destination CA accepts
the request, the CA creates a connection-oriented QP and decrypts the session key and
then replies with a reply message (REP) containing the destination QP’s information.
The session key is used to encrypt and authenticate all the following messages between
the two QPs.
To protect the session key distribution, we assume every pair of CAs in a partition
has a unique secret key. Let CA SKij be a secret key for communication between CAi
and CAj and CA SKij = CA SKji. Therefore, an REQ from CAi to CAj is encrypted
using CA SKij. The SM generates all n-to-n keys and distributes the keys to all CAs
beforehand. Based on this secret key, the session key distribution is described as
follows:
(1) CAi sends an REQ message to CAj containing a session key, SKl:
REQ( . . . , ECA SKij(SKl))
(2) CAj decrypts SKl:
SKl = DCA SKji(ECA SKij(SKl))
(3) CAi sends data to CAj: ESKl(Data)
(3)’ CAj sends data to CAi: ESKl(Data)
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After step (2), CAi and CAj can send data using SKl at any time in step (3) and
(3)’.
In contrast to a connection-oriented QP, a datagram QP can communicate with
more than one QP. To control accesses to this QP, each datagram QP carries the
destination QP’s Q Key and an access to this QP is allowed only if the Q Key in the
requesting packet is the same as the one in the receiving QP. Therefore, before two
datagram QPs send data, they need to exchange packets to know each other’s Q Key.
As noted earlier, the Q Key in the packet is also plaintext, so it is vulnerable to the
capturing attack. To prevent this problem, we propose a secret key be assigned to
each Q Key and exchanged. The following explains a reliable datagram QP’s commu-
nication establishment steps. In an unreliable datagram communication, SIDR REQ
and SIDR REP are used instead of REQ and REP.
(1) CAi sends an REQ message to CAj containing a session key, SKl:
REQ( ..., Q Keylocal, ECA SKij(SKl))
(2) CAj decrypts SKl:
SKl = DCA SKji(ECA SKij(SKl))
(3) CAj sends an REP message to CAi containing another session key,
SKr:
REP( ..., Q Keyremote, ECA SKji(SKr))
(4) CAi decrypts SKr:
SKr = DCA SKij(ECA SKji(SKr))
(5) CAi sends data to CAj:
ESKr(Data), Q Keyremote
(5)’ CAj sends data to CAi:
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ESKl(Data),Q Keylocal
The space to store a 128 bits session key in request and reply packets is available
in the PrivateData field in the packet formats. The space overhead for storing 1-to-n
secret keys, CA SKij, in each CA is 128 bits times the number of CAs in its partition.
If a partition consists of 210 CAs, the total space is 20K bytes including 32 bits MAC
for each secret key. If the tamper-resistant storage cannot hold all secret keys, they
can be stored in normal memory in encrypted form.
The initial overhead for generating and distributing all CA SKs is analyzed as
follows. Those secret keys are random numbers and they can be generated by the AES
function in CTR mode [33]. In a partition with 210 CAs, the total number of SA SKs
is 218. Since a recent hardware implementation of AES can encrypt at 30∼70 Gbps, it
can generate all the secret keys within a second, assuming that the length of a secret
key is 128 bits long. An SM needs to distribute the all secret keys sequentially. If an
IBA cluster has 2.5 Gbps link, assuming a 1024 bytes long packet is carrying a secret
key, it will take also less than one second to send out all the packets. Considering
fairly long operation time of cluster systems, our approach is scalable to even larger
networks since such a small initial overhead will be easily amortized.
2. Message Encryption and Authentication in IBA
Now, we will explain where an MAC is to be located in each packet and show an
example of how an authenticated encryption algorithm, GCM, is integrated into IBA.
Cyclic Redundancy-Check (CRC) codes are widely used for error detection on
data communication. IBA defines three types of CRC: Invariant CRC (ICRC), Vari-
ant CRC (VCRC), and Link Packet CRC (LPCRC) as shown in Fig. 2 (Only ICRC
and VCRC are depicted). ICRC covers all invariant fields from Local Route Header
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LRH GRH BTH ETH Data Symbols I Data ICRC/MAC VCRC
Fig. 2. IBA packet format with Message Authentication Code. ICRC covers all in-
variant fields from LRH to I Data to detect errors on the data communication.
Since ICRC does not change end-to-end, we propose to use this field as the
MAC location that will carry MAC in the security enhanced IBA (LRH: Local
Route Header, GRH: Gobal Route Header, BTH: Base Transport Header, ETH:
Extended Transport Header, ICRC: Invariant CRC, VCRC: Variant CRC).
(LRH) to I Data, not covering variant fields that switches or routers can change. In
contrast, VCRC covers the LRH up to the last byte before the VCRC. If some fields
are changed in a switch or a router, the VCRC is calculated again. LPCRC is present
at the end of all Link packets. The only Link packet in the current IBA specification
is the flow control packet, so we do not consider LPCRC.
Our main idea is to use the ICRC field as the MAC location depicted in Fig. 2.
We can gain the following two advantages in using the ICRC field. First, ICRC does
not change from end to end. It only covers static fields, so it can be considered as a
transport-level CRC. Since the authentication is an end-to-end transport feature, the
ICRC field is a nice fit for the MAC location. The second advantage is that we do
not have to change the IBA packet format, which is extremely important. By having
ICRC as a default and MAC as an option, the original drivers that use ICRC do
not have to be changed. Therefore, our idea will become fully compatible with the
current IBA.
To accommodate various authentication algorithms, Reserved field of Base Trans-
port Header (BTH) is used to identify authentication algorithms. BTH is a basic
header that every transport packet carries. If the value is zero, the packet is using
the original ICRC. Non-zero value indicates that an authentication algorithm is in
use and a MAC is stored in the ICRC field. This can be exploited to provide an on-
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demand authentication service. For instance, suppose in a partition a very important
job is running. The administrator can enable authentication for that partition by
using MAC instead of ICRC. Since the authentication can be disabled and enabled
at any time, our mechanism provides the flexible authentication service.
Although any encryption/authentication algorithm can be used for secure IBA,
it will be very helpful to take one algorithm and show its performance because we can
estimate the performance impact of our approach in real systems. We choose GCM
since it has two main advantages in terms of security and speed. Security strength
of GCM is the same as the strength of its block cipher [34, 23]. Since we use AES
in this research and it is considered to be secure without any serious weakness until
now, the confidentiality of each IBA packet can be improved greatly. With duplicate
hardware, the whole authentication can be done in parallel in several additional cycles
after AES computation [23].
Fig. 3 depicts the architecture of GCM to encrypt and authenticate packets
using AES. Packet Sequence Number (PSN) and its sequential numbers are encrypted
and XORed with plaintexts to generate ciphertexts. The header of a packet and
ciphertexts are multiplied in GF (Galois Filed) to generate an MAC. This architecture
can fully utilize the pipelined AES as shown in Fig. 3(a). The parallelism can be
further exploited by the use of the multiple encryption units depicted in Fig. 3(b).
12X IBA network can be extended in the same way. Note that the only Tag calculation
requires the previous results. The performance overhead coming from this delay will
be analyzed in Section G.
3. Stateful Ingress Filtering
Until now, we described how to provide confidentiality and authentication services in
IBA. In this section we explain how to mitigate the DoS (Type IV) attack problems
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Fig. 3. GCM architecture using AES. In the sender side, an original data,M , is divided
into multiple 128 bits long messages, M [1], M [2],..,M [m]. This substring is
encrypted by XORing the result of encryption of PSN+i. The first input
of MultH is the header of the packet and subsequent inputs are encrypted
substrings, E[i]. Note that due to the pipelining capability of recent AES
and MultH hardware, adjacent substrings are encrypted and authenticated in
parallel with a small pipelining delay. Receiver’s architecture is almost similar
except that E[i] and M [i] are switched. 4X GCM utilizes four AES hardware
to keep up with 4X InfiniBand speed. Since there is no dependence between
AES blocks, it can get nearly linear speed-up.
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Table I. Partition enforcement overhead
DT IF SIF
one switch mem r · p · k n
s
· p · k n
s
·Min(p′, p) · k
all switches mem r · p · s · k n · p · k n ·Min(p′, p) · k
Look-up/pkt h · f(p) f(p) Pr(n) · f(Min(p′, p))
for better availability.
This vulnerability stems from the fact that IBA Key checking is done in desti-
nation nodes. A straightforward remedy is to make all switch ports filter out packets
carrying illegal Keys. We call this method Duplicate Table (DT) scheme. However,
this is very inefficient in terms of memory usage and network performance because
every switch port has to maintain a partition table and all packets should be checked
at every hop. For example, when a network consists of n nodes and s switches with
r ports and all nodes join the same number of p partitions and k is the length of a
partition key in bytes, each switch will need r · p · k bytes to store partition tables,
which means r · p · s · k bytes will be used in total for the whole network as shown
in Table I. Let f(i) be the time that a table look-up function, f , takes to search an
entry from a table having i entries. DT will take f(p) at every hop, thus requiring
h · f(p) to route a packet to a destination with h, an average of hop counts.
To remove high overhead of DT, Ingress Filtering (IF) commonly used on the
Internet can be adopted in IBA. In IF, the packet filtering is applied to ingress ports
that are directly connected to nodes. If all invalid P Key packets are filtered out at
ingress ports, it is not necessary to check at intermediate hops. Therefore, IF can
increase the memory and network efficiency by using less memory and taking shorter
time as shown in Table I where n
s
is the average number of nodes directly connected
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to per switch.
Still, however, there are redundant operations in IF because it is necessary to look
up P Key tables in all ingress ports regardless of whether a DoS attack is occurring
or not. To remove such redundancy, we propose Stateful Ingress Filtering (SIF) that
filters attacking traffic only when attacks are active. To decide when and where to
enable filtering, we propose to use a trap message. In IBA, when an incoming packet’s
Key does not match the receiver’s Key, the receiver optionally sends a trap message
to its SM. We suggest this trap message convey the invalid Keys and the packet’s
source address. When the SM receives the trap message, it will find the switch port
connected to the attacking node and enables the filtering of the port.
Note that this filtering needs invalid Keys, not valid Keys. Since the current
IBA switches have a table of valid P Keys designed for the partition enforcement, we
introduce a table of invalid P Keys, referred to as Invalid P Key Table. When the
SM receives a trap message, it registers the invalid P Key to its Invalid P Key Table.
To disable this filtering when attacks end, we define Ingress P Key Violation Counter
in switch ports. It counts the number of invalid P Keys sent from the filtered node.
If the Ingress P Key Violation Counter does not increase for some time, the con-
tents of Invalid P Key Table will be flushed and the ingress filtering will be disabled.
Consequently, since SIF will be activated only when a node is injecting packets with
invalid P Keys and only where attacking traffic is coming from, it will eliminate all
redundant filtering operations of DT and IF.
One concern is that the Invalid P Key Table might grow bigger than the valid
P Key Table as an attacker uses many invalid P Keys. In this case, to prevent the
long table look-up time, the ingress filtering needs to look up P Key Table to pass
legitimate traffic with valid P Keys. The Ingress P Key Violation Counter still needs
to be counted because if it does not change for some time, the switch’s port has
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to return to the normal operation. When disabling filtering, it is necessary to flush
Invalid P Key Table and reset Ingress P Key Violation Counter. Due to this, any
attempts to stage a DoS attack on the SM by triggering multiple trap messages will
also be blocked soon. This is because once the number of invalid P Keys becomes
larger than the valid P Key Table, packets only with valid P Keys will be passed.
SIF’s overhead depends on how often DoS attacks are occurring and how many
invalid P Keys are used for the attacks. Let Pr(n) be the probability that one node
joins a P Key attack and let p′ be the number of invalid P Keys used in the P Key
attacks. The memory overhead for one switch is n
s
·Min(p′, p) · k bytes and the table
look-up operation will be Pr(n) · f(Min(p′, p)) where Min(p′, p) is the minimum
between p′ and p. By limiting the maximum p′, the memory overhead will be smaller
than or equal to that of DT or IF. Furthermore, considering that DoS attacks are not
occurring often, the low Pr(n) will make the table look-up overhead of SIF negligible.
4. Source Identification Scheme in IBA
One more concern to implement the SIF is that a compromised node may use fake
source addresses, referred to as spoofing. In this case, the SIF would block wrong
ports. Since IBA allows software to choose which source address will be used in an
outgoing packet, spoofing is possible if a hacker successfully manipulates the address
information in a CA.
To remove this problem, a source identification scheme capable of tracing back
the real attackers is necessary. In [35], Aljifri categorized traceback methods into four
categories: link testing, logging, ICMP-based traceback, and packet marking. Since
link testing and ICMP-based traceback should generate additional traffic, they will
degrade the overall performance of cluster. Logging requires additional storage and
computing power in routers/switches, which are not desirable due to additional costs.
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1111111010 54 bits of 0 64 bits of assigned value
(a) Link-local address format
1111111011 38 bits of 0 16 bits of Subnet prefix 64 bits of assigned value
(b) Site-local address format
Fig. 4. GRH address format. GRH can be in use both within a subnet and be-
tween subnets by using link-local prefix, 1111111010, and site-local prefix,
1111111011, respecively. 64 bits are used for addressing inside a subnet and an
additional subnet address (16 bits) is necessary for addressing between subnets.
The commonly unused 38 bits of two formats can be used as MF.
In contrast, marking schemes proposed in [36, 37, 38] simply mark (or write) some
information in packets while routing the packets to help receiving nodes investigate
where the attacking traffic comes from. Since marking schemes do not cause additional
overhead except additional marking time in each switch, we choose to develop a
marking scheme in this study.
a. Marking Field in IBA
The first requirement to use any marking scheme is an additional space in an IBA
packet to mark on, referred to as Marking Field (MF). An IBA packet uses different
headers relying on where a destination node is located. If a destination and a source
nodes are located in the same subnet, LRH is enough to switch inside a subnet. But
IBA specifies that a GRH can be used within a subnet by setting the link-local prefix
to 1111111010 as depicted in Fig. 4(a). If the two communicating nodes are located
in different subnets, the GRH is necessary to route these packets properly. For this,
the destination address should set the site-local prefix to 1111111011 described in
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Fig. 4(b). Therefore, the 10 bits prefix indicates whether a packet’s destination node
is inside the site. If a packet is leaving a site, we do not mark the packet. Otherwise,
54 and 38 bits of a destination address are set to zeroes. We suggest using the common
38 bits as the MF.
b. Deterministic Packet Marking
In a deterministic marking algorithm, each switch (or router) writes its own infor-
mation such as switch indexes in every packet’s MF. When a cluster is not so big,
end nodes and switches are usually connected in a tree structure. For example, the
lowest level switches equipped with tens of ports are connecting end nodes and those
switches are connected to upper level switches hierarchically. In this environment,
all hops can be most likely recorded in the MF. If there are n switches in a cluster,
b38/ log nc hops can be recorded in the 38 bits marking field. Alternatively, each
switch’s port index can be recorded instead of the switch index. In this method with
the 38 bits MF, b38/ log pc hops will be traced back where p is the maximum number
of ports in switches.
We show an example of a deterministic packet marking on a fat tree which is the
most popular network topology in IBA clusters. Fig. 5(a) depicts a 3-level fat tree in
a logical view. As the level goes up, the bandwidth of each link is squared to provide
non-blocking switching. Before marking packets, each port is first numbered in its
switch using log p bits where p is the number of ports in the switch. In Fig. 5(a),
two-bit port numbers are shown next to links. Accordingly, an address of a leaf node
is the concatenation of port numbers from the top level switch to the lowest level
switch. For example, the address of node 6 is (00,01,10).
To identify a source node, when a packet traverses to upper levels, each switch
writes down the index of the port that the packet comes through. For example, the
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00 01 10 11
00 01 10 11
00 01 10 11
Node
6
(-,-,10)
(-,01,10)
(00,01,10)
1
4
16
(00,01,10)
00 00 00 00
01 01
10
(00,01,10) (00,01,10) (00,01,10)
(a) logical topology (b) an implementation using 8-port basic switches
Fig. 5. Deterministic packet marking on 3-level fat tree. As a packet goes up, each
switch marks an incoming port’s number in the packet’s MF. Marking com-
pletes when a packet reaches the top level switch. This marking scheme works
for a fat tree built by a large number of minimal basic switches since this
scheme marks only port numbers not switch indexes.
lowest switch marks 10 on packets coming from node 6, so their MF will be (-,-,10).
Then, 01 and 00 are written at the upward switches. As a result, the MF field will
have (00,01,10) at the top level switch which is exactly same as node 6’s address.
A real implementation of the fat tree using a simple small-size switch is depicted in
Fig. 5(b). Even though packets coming from one leaf node can take different upward
paths, the recorded MF values are always the same because each switch records a
port number, not a switch index. As described in Fig. 5(b), although packets from
node 6 take four different paths, all the recorded values are (00,01,10). When the
maximum number of ports is p, a 38 bits long MF will record at most b38/ log pc
hops. Assuming all intermediate nodes are switches and leaf nodes are computing
nodes or storage nodes, the maximum size of cluster which the 38 bits MF supports
is pb38/ log pc as summarized in Table II.
However, when a cluster consists of tens or hundreds of thousands of nodes with
regular interconnects such as mesh and hypercube, the average number of hops be-
comes so large that deterministic packet marking schemes cannot work. For example,
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Table II. Scalability of Deterministic Packet Marking scheme
Topology Max ports per switch Max Cluster Size
fat-tree p pb38/ log pc
the diameter of a 20×20 mesh network is 39 where diameter is the longest hop in
the shortest paths between any pair of nodes. Furthermore, when the routing is not
static but adaptive, recording all hops becomes impossible because a routing path can
be much longer than the shortest path depending on the current network condition.
Therefore, the deterministic marking schemes will be inapplicable to large networks
with regular topologies or adaptive routing schemes.
c. Deterministic Distance Packet Marking
To alleviate this problem, we propose the Deterministic Distance Packet Marking
(DDPM) scheme. This scheme records only relative distance from the current position
of a packet to the source node without keeping track of intermediate paths. For
example, in an n-dimensional mesh, we locate a node, X by using its coordinate,
(x0, x1, ..., xn−1). A relative distance between two nodes, X (x0, x1, ..., xn−1) and Y
(y0, y1, ..., yn−1), can be defined as a vector V (v0, v1, ..., vn−1) where vi = yi - xi. This
vector is the coordinate difference. There is a unique distance vector between any two
nodes in the network. That is, with a distance vector V , node Y identifies a unique
node, X.
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Inputs: Destination D (d0, d1, ..., dn−1)
Current X (x0, x1, ..., xn−1)
Output: Next Y (y0, y1, ..., yn−1)
Source S (s0, s1, ..., sn−1)
Variables: Distance V (v0, v1, ..., vn−1)
New distance V ′ (v0′, v1′, ..., vn−1′)
Difference ∆ (δ0, δ1, ..., δn−1)
Procedure:
if X = D then
V := Extract MF();
S := X - V ;
exit;
endif
Y := Routing(V );
V := Extract MF();
∆ := Y - X;
V ′ := V + ∆;
Store MF(V ′);
exit;
Algorithm 1. Deterministic Distance Packet Marking
In each hop, each packet’s distance vector is updated. V is set to a zero vector
when a packet first enters a switch from a node, which is hardcoded in switch or
CA. After the switch decides the next hop, it updates the distance vector. In regular
networks, a packet moves by one hop in one dimension at each switching. Therefore,
at each hop, one vi is added or subtracted according to the routing direction. After a
switch stores the new distance vector V in the MF, the switch transmits the packet
to the next switch. The full algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. Routing() is
a function that returns the next node coordinate. Extract MF() returns a distance
vector from the GRH header, and Store MF() stores it in the header. Regardless of
intermediate routing paths, the final distance vector V is the exact difference from
the source to the destination node. Therefore, the destination can identify the source
node instantly with only one packet.
Fig. 6(a) shows an example that a packet traverses a 2-D mesh adaptively from
(1,1) and (2,3).
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(0,0,0)
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(-1,0,0)
(-1,0,1)
(0,0,1)
(a) 4×4 mesh (b) 3-hypercube
Fig. 6. An exmaple of deterministic distance packet marking. When a packet traverses
through switches, each switch calculates the difference between its own coor-
dinate and a neighboring switch passing the packet. The difference is added
up to the current distance vector to update the MF. The receiving node easily
identifies the source node by subtracting (or XORing) the distance vector from
the receiving node’s position. Note that this marking algorithm is robust to
any adaptive routing algorithms which allow looping as shown in (a).
The distance vector changes as following: (0,0), (1,0), (2,0), (2,-1), (1,-1), (1,0),
(1,1), and (1,2). When (2,3) node receives the distance vector (1,2), it can subtract
(1,2) from (2,3) and quickly identify the source (1,1). In the hypercube in Fig. 6(b),
the distance vector changes as following: (0,0,0), (1,0,0), (1,0,1), (0,0,1), (0,1,1),
(0,1,0), and (1,1,0). (0,0,0) can identify the source (1,1,0) by XORing its coordinate
(0,0,0) and the distance vector (1,1,0). Note that in hypercube XOR is used instead
of subtract.
The DDPM can support a larger number of nodes compared to the deterministic
marking algorithm regardless of routing policies. To support n×n 2-D mesh and torus,
the half of the 38 bits MF contains the distance in one dimension. The distance can
be negative, so 218× 218 2-D mesh and torus networks can be marked by the DDPM.
For a 3-D mesh and torus, the DDPM can mark 211× 211× 211 networks by splitting
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Table III. Scalability of Deterministic Distance Packet Marking scheme
Topology Required Field Max Cluster Size
n× n mesh, torus 2 log n - 2 218 × 218
n× n× n mesh, torus 3 log n - 3 211 × 211 × 211
n-cube hypercube log2n 238
the MF into three parts (233 nodes cluster). For the hypercube, the whole MF can be
used for the distance vector, so the DDPM can mark 38-cube hypercube (238 nodes
cluster). Table III summarizes these facts.
F. Security Analysis
• Defending Attacks
Type I attack : As we showed an example in Section 2, GCM encrypts using
AES with the CTR mode considering a PSN as a counter. Since AES is considered to
be secure without any serious weakness until now, the brute-force attack is believed
to be the most effective attack. When a 128 bits key is used, on average 2127 trials are
needed to find the key, which is infeasible in the foreseeable future. Another concern
is the multiple use of the same PSN since it will expose partial information of original
plaintexts even though the amount of information is not much. Suppose E1 and E2
are two different ciphertexts using the same counter C and the same secret key, K.
If a hacker gets these two ciphertexts and XOR them, he will get an XOR of two
original plaintexts by clearing out the keystream.
In the QP-level key management, since a new session key is assigned to a new
communication session, the multiple use of the same PSN will not cause this problem.
However, it does in the partition-level key management since multiple consumers will
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use the same key. To avoid the problem, we propose a 128 bits random number be
created and shared during a communication set-up phase. The use of a PSN along
with a random number as an input to AES will remove the concern except when
any two random numbers happen to be the same, called collision. The probability,
Pcollision, that any two random numbers out of given n integers with range [1,d] are
same is approximated as in equation (3.1) [39].
Pcollision = 1− e
−(n(n−1))/2d (3.1)
Suppose 210 nodes keep sending packets at their full speed in 1X IBA (2.5 Gbps) for
ten years and the average length of packets is 1024 bytes. During the time, around
261 random numbers will be generated. Therefore,
Pcollision = 1− e
−(261(261−1))/2129 ≈ 0.0078
Considering the normal amount of traffic, Pcollision will be far less than this approxi-
mation. Therefore, the proposed encryption scheme will be secure in the foreseeable
future.
Type II attack : Any MAC algorithms using 32 bits MAC can be used to
remove Type II attack. It is known that the security strength of GCM is the same
as the strength of its block cipher, AES [34, 23]. As Hellekalek et al. concluded that
pseudorandom numbers generated by AES are indistinguishable from real random
numbers [33], a 32 bits tag generated by GCM using AES is a near random number.
Therefore, on average after 231 trials, a hacker can successfully make an authentic
MAC without a legitimate key. In an IBA cluster with 2.5 Gbps link, assuming all
packets are 1024 bytes long, 218 packets can be generated in one second. This means it
will take the hacker about less than three hours to spoof a packet. However, note that
the attacker should send wrong MACs 231 times on average before he succeeds. These
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attacks can be detected by issuing an alert in a case of consecutive authentication
errors.
Type III attack : The DDPM described in Section 4 can trace back the original
location of an attacking node, which is robust to fake addresses.
Type IV attack : The SIF blocks DoS attacks which are using illegal Keys.
• Replay Attacks
In replay attacks, a hacker captures a packet carrying a legitimate MAC and keeps
sending it to disrupt the network. Our authentication scheme is vulnerable to this
attack because the proposed scheme is per packet authentication method. Therefore,
repeated packets will be considered as authentic due to the legitimate MAC. Among
possible approaches, timestamps can be deployed in IBA clusters [40]. In the times-
tamps scheme, a sending node inserts a timestamp into each packet and a receiving
node checks whether this timestamp is sufficiently close to the local time. For sure,
the timestamps should be included for generating MACs to prevent false timestamps.
There are two basic requirements to use this scheme. One is that communication
nodes should be synchronized and the other is that each packet should have a space
to carry a timestamp. In a cluster system, the global time synchronization is rather
easy because time synchronization packets can be broadcasted periodically with a
very short delay. Concerning the space, as we mentioned in Section 4, the GRH can
be used in every packet and some bits out of MF can used to store a timestamp
as long as the rest of MF bits support the network. For example, 4K nodes mesh
network requires 14 bits as a marking field. Then, 24 bits can be used as a timestamp
space and it will wrap around in 194 days when the time granularity is second. If
the network is huge and the administrator is more concerned about the replay attack
than type III attack, the source identification scheme may be disabled and the whole
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38 bits can be used for timestamps, which will make the wrap-around time thousands
of years.
• Tamper-Resistant Storage
As we assumed before, each device has tamper-resistant storage. This storage
is usually built using battery backed RAM (BBRAM) [41]. Its contents will be in-
stantly zeroed by cutting off the power supply once a tamper is detected. FIPS 140-1
recommends BBRAM to store sensitive data [42]. The contents of BBRAM should
be toggled periodically because if the same data is stored for a long time the contents
can be imprinted into RAM. In addition, each device should be hardwired to keep any
secret information on BBRAM only accessible through its subnet manager. Finally,
all secret keys stored in devices’ BBRAM will be protected against any software and
physical attacks.
G. Performance Analysis
1. Simulation Testbed
Our IBA testbed includes packet-level switches and host channel adapters compliant
with the IBA specification [30]. For our experiments, we simulated a 16-node network
designed using 5-port switches. To simulate the Single Data Rate (SDR) and Double
Data Rate (DDR), we use high bandwidth physical links up to 60 Gbps (DDR 12X).
For performance analysis, we use best-effort traffic only.
2. Performance Slowdown by Encryption & Authentication
To see the impact of encryption/authentication scheme, we compare end-to-end la-
tency. All delays of security operations are added up to the total latency. A recent
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(a) 2.5 Gbps IBA (b) 48 Gbps IBA, 256 Bytes packet
Fig. 7. Performance slowdown due to security operations. (a) Security configuration
where both encryption and authentication are enabled incurs relatively small
overhead ranging from 0.7% to 12.4%, compared to No Security configuration.
(b) As IBA network speed increases, the performance overhead of Security con-
figuration also increases proportionally. However, since the additional overhead
is still nanoseconds scale, Security configuration will be practical.
design of AES can encrypt 30∼70 Gbps using 0.18µm CMOS with 80 ns of initial
latency [43, 13]. We call this initial latency AES latency. This means that at the
sender in Fig. 3(a) it takes one AES latency to get E[1] at the first encryption. The
subsequent encryptions till E[m] are pipelined with no delay. According to [23], a
parallel implementation of multH can keep up with any pipelined implementation of
AES. Calculating Tag requires one more multH latency because it should wait until
the completion of E[m] in our simulation. So we set the total additional overhead to
320 ns per packet. We assume that the table look-up time for partition- or QP-level
secret key is negligible. If there are a huge number of QP-level secret keys, it will be
necessary to take the look-up time into account.
Fig. 7(a) shows the overall network performance slowdown incurred by encryption
and authentication. No Security represents the original IBA configuration without
any security function enabled. In the Security configuration, all encryption/authentication
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are enabled. As the packet length increases from 64 bytes to 1024 bytes, the average
latency decreases proportionally from 12.4% to 5.5%, 2.6%, 1.2%, and 0.7% since the
additional delay is constant to the packet length.
To see the effect of our scheme on very high speed networks, we simulate up to
60 Gbps (DDR 12X IBA). To rule out network congestion effect, we scaled down the
injection rate in high speed networks. The packet length is set to 256 bytes as default.
As shown in Fig. 7(b), the proportion of security overhead is increasing because the
320 ns AES latency is not changing while the average network latency decreases.
Even though our scheme incurs more performance overhead proportionally in high
speed IBA networks, the total additional latency is shorter than one microsecond,
hopefully making our scheme still practical.
3. Stateful Ingress Filter Simulation
To investigate the effectiveness of the SIF, we compare the SIF with the DT and
the IF. When DoS attacks are very rare or not happening, the SIF is definitely the
most efficient because it induces no delay while the DT and the IF require constant
additional delay regardless of the occurrence of DoS attacks. In the DT, all switch
ports compare each packet’s Key with valid Keys stored in switches while in the IF
only ingress switch ports do so. According to the IBA specification, each port can
have at most 32768 P Keys, so the maximum size of memory to store all the P Keys
is 64K bytes because one P Key is 16 bits long. Considering that the QP-level key
management can be enabled and the number of QPs is much larger than that of
P Keys, we assume the size of storage for holding all Keys is 1024K bytes in our
simulation. According to a cache access model [44], 1024K bytes SRAM memory
can be accessed within 5 ns. Therefore, the DT has 5 ns additional delay at every
switching port while the IF has the delay only at ingress ports.
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Fig. 8. Effect of SIF. (a) DT, IF, and SIF block DoS attacks successfully and show
little difference in terms of total latency except at the input load 70% where
SIF shows the best performance. Note that since SIF is enabled only when
there are active DoS attacks, SIF will show the best performance in normal
situation. (b) and (c) shows the distribution of end-to-end latency. Since IF
blocks all DoS traffic from coming into IBA network, there is no difference
in end-to-end latency as shown in (b). However, SIF allows DoS traffic for
short time. Due to this, there are high spikes of end-to-end latency in (c). All
static methods, DPT and IF, have to incur constant overhead regardless of the
occurrence of DoS attacks.
We simulate a DoS attack in the middle of the simulation and measure the average
end-to-end delay in four configurations: Original, DT, IF, and SIF shown in Fig. 8(a).
The simulation consists of four sets of simulations varying the input load from 40%
to 70%. The first four bars in the figure are tested with input load 40% and so forth.
The first bar of each set shows the average end-to-end latency under a DoS attack in
the original configuration. As the input load increases, the network performance is
further deteriorating. This is because the DoS attack saturates the already heavily
loaded network by injecting more traffic, thus resulting in significant delays of normal
traffic. The second and third bars of each set show the average delay of the DT
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and the IF. Since they block all illegal traffic, their latencies are not affected by the
attack. However, redundant P Key table look-up operations incur some amount of
delay. Especially, under the heavy traffic, their filtering overhead results in longer
delay than the SIF. The fourth bar is showing the performance of SIF. Note that the
SIF enables port filtering only when a DoS attack is active. Therefore, with SIF there
is a delay to register an illegal Key in appropriate ingress ports after detecting the
illegal key. During the time, the attack affects other normal traffic even though its
overhead is small. Fig. 8(c) shows that the SIF blocks the traffic instantly but the
delay results in high spikes of end-to-end latency in the middle the simulation. In
contrast, the IF in Fig. 8(b) does not have such variations. This explains that the
average latencies of the SIF for the input load with 50% and 60% are slightly longer
than those of the DT and the IF
However, even with this effect the SIF in the input load 70% shows the best
performance. This implies that the ingress filtering in the DT and the IF can make
a tangible effect on heavily loaded networks. Standard deviations of the SIF at 40%
and 50% input load are around 14 and 11, standing higher than those of the DT and
the IF, around 5 and 8, due to the short-lived DoS attack. But at the high load up to
70%, standard deviations for all methods become much bigger because of high traffic.
H. Conclusion
This paper addresses a security provisioning framework for secure IBA. We have ar-
gued that the security vulnerability inside IBA can be a serious problem and proposed
a comprehensive framework to enhance IBA security in view of confidentiality, au-
thentication, and availability. For confidentiality and authentication, we proposed
partition-level and QP-level secret key management schemes and showed how IBA
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accommodates GCM with minor modification to the IBA specification. For better
availability, we proposed a stateful ingress filtering scheme which is enabled only when
there is a DoS attack using invalid IBA Keys. The packet marking algorithms further
improve the availability by identifying source nodes instantly.
The important conclusions of this work are the following: First, we elaborated
on the IBA Key exposure problem and simulated possible DoS attacks inside IBA
cluster systems. Simulation results showed that overall performance can be affected
significantly. Second, we also showed that the overall performance overhead by adopt-
ing an encryption and authentication algorithm into IBA clusters can be as low as
0.7%. Considering the security strength of GCM with AES, our scheme improves
the security of IBA significantly with marginal performance degradation. Third, our
stateful ingress filtering incurs a low performance overhead by being active only when
necessary. Furthermore, our source identification algorithm successfully identifies real
attackers in large irregular networks and huge regular networks having 236 nodes with
2-D mesh and torus topology or 238 nodes with hypercube topology.
We are currently examining a number of possible extensions of this work. First,
we would like to implement our ideas and build a real testbed. Second, we will
extend our research to other cluster interconnects like Quadrics, Myrinet, and Gigabit
Ethernet. Since they have common contraints such as the speed limitation on security
operations, the hardware approach used in this research will be applicable to other
interconnects. Third, in a very large size IBA cluster, the number of QP-level secret
keys become so big that its look-up time is expected to become longer. For this,
we are investigating a fast secret key management with architectural support. Last,
since the OS can get much benefit from the proposed secure IBA for better cluster
security, we plan to investigate this possibility.
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CHAPTER IV
A SESSION KEY CACHING AND PREFETCHING SCHEME FOR SECURE
COMMUNICATION IN CLUSTER SYSTEMS
A. Introduction
Cluster systems have emerged as the most cost-effective solution for many kinds of
applications and services. As many institutes like banks, military, and government
agents that can be targets of intensified terrors adopt cluster systems, the importance
of cluster security increases significantly. Besides, ordinary hackers are also attracted
to cluster systems because they can stage a massive security attack by utilizing abun-
dant resources such as huge computation power, large disk space, and high speed
networks. Unfortunately, traditional security countermeasures like firewalls and in-
trusion detection systems (IDS) are not sufficient to provide complete security for
cluster systems, as shown in the past successful attacks on cluster systems [45].
Among many possible attacks, we focus on physical and software attacks on clus-
ter communications∗. Physical attacks on cluster communications capture or modify
data from cluster interconnects through a snooping device attachable to the intercon-
nects. Since all cluster communication messages are plaintext, one successful physical
attack will leak a significant amount of information from cluster systems. In a recent
survey questioned to supercomputer administrators [46], 8 percent of respondents re-
ported that there were unlawful physical approaches to their systems, and another 8
percent told that someone had tried to bribe inside personnel to help them infiltrate
cluster systems. Considering tremendous aftereffects of physical attacks, the percent-
ages do not seem negligible at all. Moreover, as shown in [5], cluster interconnects can
∗Cluster communication in this paper is equivalent to intra-cluster communication.
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be used to connect multiple clusters and storage systems, inevitably having its cable
vulnerable to possible physical attacks. Therefore, we believe that the possibility of
physical attacks cannot be overlooked any more, so the attacks should be prevented
with great care.
Meanwhile, software attacks on cluster communication are done by a hacker who
acquired a cluster account illegitimately and logged into a cluster node as a normal
cluster user. If the hacker injects or sniffs packets without constraints, the cluster sys-
tem will be compromised seriously. Note that preventing software attacks on cluster
communication can be very effective in bolstering cluster security because the hacker
may prefer such attacks to other software attacks. Moreover, the attacks on cluster
communications may be the last option for the hacker; thanks to enhanced cluster
security by using partitioning, sandboxing, multi-level security, or other confinement
schemes [47, 48, 49, 50], other possible software attacks beyond predefined resources
can be prevented. Consequently, we believe that cluster communications need to be
protected effectively against software attacks as well as physical attacks.
To prevent these attacks, in the previous chapter, we proposed a comprehensive
security framework for InfiniBand cluster systems. The framework uses a fine-grained
security scheme where any two communicating processes or queue-pairs in InfiniBand
architecture (IBA) share a session key dynamically to encrypt/authenticate all the
communications. Since in their framework the security function resides in cluster
interconnect cards (CICs), not in host CPUs, it causes no additional performance
overhead to host CPUs. However, we assumed that session keys stored in the CIC
are accessible for cryptographic operations without any delay. This assumption of
zero delay in session key access time is unrealistic for the following reasons. If the
session keys are stored in an off-chip memory in the CIC, every packet arrival incurs
an additional memory access, resulting in a very long packet processing time. Even
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if a data cache in an embedded processor in the CIC can be used to store the session
keys, a cryptographic hardware that is usually implemented as a separate hardware
module cannot share the data cache with the embedded processor easily. As a remedy
for this, the hardware cryptographic unit can have its own cache to store recently used
session keys, referred to as session key cache (SKC). In order for the SKC to be used
in the CIC, a comprehensive study is necessary to answer the following important
questions:
• How will the CIC look like? Where are the hardware cryptographic unit and
SKC located? And what are their hardware costs in terms of area and power
consumption? If physical attacks are possible, the CIC can be vulnerable to the
attack, too. Then, what kind of security technology should be applied to the
CIC to protect the CIC from the physical attacks?
• Is a small SKC scalable to large-scale cluster systems? Will there exist any
analytic model to estimate a proper size of the SKC? What is the relationship
between the size and the hit rate of the SKC?
• If there are multiple applications (or processes) running on a node, does this
affect hit rates of the SKC? If so, is there a solution to maintain a high SKC
hit rate? Does the solution need to closely work with the OS’s schedulers? Will
the solution work well consistently with various cluster schedulers?
We attempt to answer these questions by doing rigorous research on cluster traffic
simulation and analysis. We first provide a detailed design of the CIC. Second, to
estimate the behavior of the SKC in large-scale clusters, we develop an analytical
model based on an observation that cluster traffic patterns are well fit to exponential
distributions [51]. We use this model to find out the relationship between SKC sizes
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and hit rates of the SKC. Third, to maintain a short session key access time even in
multitasking environment we propose to incorporate a prefetch buffer in the CIC to
fetch session keys ahead of time by predicting the next scheduling decision. Finally,
to evaluate the new CIC design, we developed a trace-driven simulator by modifying
a cycle-accurate cluster network simulator that was used in [52, 30, 53]. We captured
real traces from an SGI Altix 3700 supercomputer by modifying source codes of NAS
parallel benchmarks. We also developed five schedulers: Linux local, spin-block (SB)
[54], dynamic coscheduling with spin-block (DCS-SB) [55, 56], periodic boosting (PB)
[55], and gang scheduler [57, 58].
Simulation results show that an SKC reduces security overhead on network la-
tency by 50 percent on average, compared to non-SKC configurations. In multitasking
environments, the session key prefetching scheme is helpful in reducing network la-
tency by 5 percent more on average. An analytic cache simulation estimates that a
16-Kbyte SKC can support up to thousands of session keys with high SKC hit rates.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section B explains a threat
model of our research, and describes major challenges in providing high performance
cluster security. In Section C, we propose the design of an SKC and a prefetch
buffer, an analytical model for NAS parallel benchmarks, and a prefetching scheme.
Simulation results and their analysis are presented in Section D, followed by related
work and concluding remarks of this chapter in Sections E and F.
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B. High Performance Cluster Security
In this section, we describe the threat model and the architectural environment of
our research, and then we advocate the CIC approach for high-performance cluster
security by comparing three possible scenarios: host CPU, security coprocessor, and
the CIC.
1. Threat Model
At first, we would like to begin with defining a threat model in order to clarify what
kinds of threats we want to defend against. As for physical attacks, we assume
the following constraints. We assume that an intruder can access a cluster system
physically and he wants to be as unobtrusive as possible in order to go unnoticed. So
he prefers installing a snooping device in the system to accessing a console connected
to the cluster system to get a root privilege or copy data from the console so that he
can steal data from the system secretly for a long time [59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66,
14, 13, 67, 68]. Many previous studies have investigated physical attack prevention
mechanisms for a single system or each cluster node [59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66]. So we
assume it is impossible to capture or modify data from processor, memory system,
memory bus, or hard drives. In addition, based on the studies of security coprocessor
and smartcard [69, 70], we also assume that the CIC has tamper-resistant mechanism
so that some part of the CIC can be physical attack-proof. As shown in Figure
9, we assume that the tamper-resistant mechanism is applied to the CIC controller
containing an embedded processor and caches, while other components like the CIC
memory and its memory bus are insecure, which is a common assumption in hardware
security research. Other cluster components including switch/router and cables are
also assumed to be vulnerable to physical attacks.
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As for software attacks, we assume that a hacker compromised a cluster node,
so he has a full access to cluster interconnects through the node’s CIC. We assume
that a security compromise in one node does not mean that the whole cluster system
is compromised. This assumption is based on that system administrators can apply
appropriate confinement schemes such as logical partitioning, sandboxing, or multi-
level security to confine security attacks to predefined resources [47, 48, 49, 50]. We
also assume that switch/router are vulnerable to software attacks, so they can be
configured to mirror all traffic to some ports.
Interestingly, under the above assumptions, a physical intruder and a software
hacker will do a similar thing; they capture and inject packets from and to the cluster
interconnects. Through capturing attacks, they can steal data. If a cluster system
deals with confidential or classified data, data theft itself is a serious problem. Besides,
captured plaintext packets may reveal information of a global root privilege. Through
injecting attacks, they can inject new packets or modify in-transit packets. Without
a proper authentication scheme, any illegal modification on confidential data could
go unnoticed. In addition, the hacker can stage a spoofing attack using fake source
addresses so that it reaches other nodes beyond confined resources.
2. Solutions to Secure User-Level Communications
Before we propose a solution to the above mentioned security problems, we provide
the rationale behind the current design using CIC, not using host CPU or security co-
processor. First of all, it is very important to understand the main difference between
traditional communication and high-performance cluster communication. Traditional
data communication involves considerable OS interventions that need multiple mem-
ory copies, with centralized communication stack processing. A long latency with a
large overhead of a host CPU has been a big obstacle to high performance computing.
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To solve this problem, most of high-end cluster systems have used the user-level com-
munication (ULC) including Myrinet and InfiniBand [29, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 12, 76],
which allows applications to bypass the OS to access network adapters directly. An
instance of the ULC usually consists of two stages: setup and data transfer. In the
setup stage, an application requests the OS for an access to its network adapter. The
OS then checks the request to guarantee the protection of the memory and communi-
cation among multiple applications, and approves the request by giving it a handler
to access the network adapter. In the data transfer stage, the application can send
and receive data directly using the handler. As a result, memory copies are reduced
dramatically because data are transferred between the application’s memory area and
the network adapter without any interventions by the OS.
An easy solution to secure ULC is the host CPU approach; before an application
sends a message, a host CPU executes a security function to encrypt it, and then a
receiving application calls another security function to decrypt the message. However,
it is well known that such cryptographic operations done by the host CPU incurs
significant performance overhead by consuming a large amount of CPU time [77,
78, 79, 80]. For example, a recent study on performance analysis of transport layer
security (TLS) web servers [78] shows in an experiment that the encryption and
authentication operations was almost the same as the original web server’s execution
time, meaning that the cryptographic operations incur 100% performance overhead.
So, it is quite obvious that such overhead will be intolerable for most cluster systems
because one of main purposes of the cluster systems is to provide high performance
computing power.
Another possible solution is the security coprocessor approach; security copro-
cessors can take over the host CPU’s cryptographic operations. In fact, this approach
was thoroughly investigated in [81]. It found out in real experiments of various secu-
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rity coprocessors that the use of the coprocessor needs additional PCI transactions for
memory copies to/from the coprocessor and they become a limiting factor of system
performance.
By agreeing with [81]’s conclusion that the cryptographic support for secure
communication needs to be done in other places other than the security coproces-
sor, we advocate that a CIC augmented with security hardware should implement
secure ULC. This CIC approach will not need the additional PCI transactions for
memory copies. Applications can simply copy data to/from the CIC as in normal
ULC operations so that the CIC takes care of all cryptographic operations by using
the security hardware in it. Therefore, we believe that the CIC approach completely
satisfies ULC’s requirements for low latency and less OS involvement as well as meets
new demands for secure cluster systems.
C. Architectural Support for Secure Cluster Communication
In this section, we first explain the reason why we propose an SKC in the CIC for
secure cluster communication, and then we present a detailed architecture for an
SKC. Then, we develop an analytical model in order to find the right size of the SKC.
For further enhancement, we suggest a coscheduling-aware prefetching scheme.
1. Session Key Cache Architecture
In the fine-grained security scheme where a pair of communicating processes (or
queue-pairs in InfiniBand) share a unique session key as proposed in [48], each packet
needs to carry a session key identifier so that the receiving CIC can look up a corre-
sponding session key. If all the session keys are stored in an off-chip external memory,
every packet transmission requires additional delay for accessing the session keys. To
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minimize average session key access time, we propose the CIC should have an on-chip
SRAM, referred to as session key cache (SKC), for storing recently used session keys,.
Figure 9 depicts a general CIC design. The CIC controller is assumed to be
tamper-resistant while other components are not. The embedded processor is in
charge of all communication processing including packetization, connection manage-
ment, and protection, etc. Data Link unit represents any data link layer module that
manages data send/receive across physical links by doing error detection, flow con-
trol, and buffering. Security Unit controlled by the embedded processor is a generic
module for implementation of any security algorithms.
For security management, each embedded processor needs to be fabricated to
carry at least one unique secret key or a private key for protecting an initial security
setup such as distributing a system-wide secret key. To avoid the long system re-
initialization at every system rebooting, it is better for the CIC to store the system-
wide secret key and related secret information in non-volatile memory. Note that it
is necessary to encrypt/authenticate all data available in the untrusted area.
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The SKC stores recently accessed session keys. Upon a session key cache miss,
the SKC fetches the session key from the external memory. Least Recently Used
(LRU) is used as a replacement policy to utilize temporal locality. For now, the SKC
is assumed to be a fully associative cache in which a session key can be stored at
any locations. Each cache entry should be large enough to hold one session key and
its identifier. To further increase the session key hit rate, we propose to add a small
buffer next to the SKC, called a Prefetch Buffer, that will be explained in Section 3.
To estimate our scheme’s impact on power and space of the CIC as well as
on the overall performance, we choose Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [23] because
its authenticated encryption is enough to prevent eavesdropping and authentication
attacks described in our threat model. Its space and energy consumption are analyzed
as follows: a recently designed GCM’s throughput is about 35 Gbps at 271 MHz clock
rate, consuming around 500,000 gates [82]. According to [83], AMIS can make an
ASIC with high density (100,000 Gates / mm2) and low power (30nW/MHz/Gate
@ 1.8V) using 0.18 µm technology. By using this technology, one GCM block will
consume 5 mm2 space and 4 Watt with 271MHz clock speed. Meanwhile, we can
estimate the space and power overhead of the SKC and the prefetch buffer by using
CACTI model. An 16-Kbyte SKC with an entry size of 32 bytes needs 36.8 mm2
space and 0.347 Watt, and a 16-entry prefetch buffer needs 2.9 mm2 space and 0.132
Watt. Therefore, the total space and power for a GCM, an SKC, and a prefetch buffer
is 44.7 mm2 and 4.479 Watt, respectively.
2. Size of the SKC
A bigger SKC will increase the SKC hit rate, but its size will soon begin to matter
with the big space overhead and long access time as well as hardware cost. In this
section, we develop an analytical method to estimate a proper cache size by modeling
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process-to-process communications in cluster traffic.
One study [51] modeled and analyzed the workload characteristics of NAS par-
allel benchmarks. It showed that most benchmarks follow a traditional ON-OFF
traffic pattern. That is, each process will have a communication period ON, followed
by a computation period OFF that has few communications. The most interesting
observation in the study is that the lengths of ON and OFF are well fit to expo-
nential distributions. Owing to the distribution’s memoryless characteristic, we can
analytically model how many processes will be in ON stage concurrently. n processes
with the ON/OFF traffic pattern can be represented as a Markov chain with state
space {0, 1, . . . , n}, where n is the number of processors in a cluster system,
assuming that one process is running on each processor. A transition happens only
between adjacent states as depicted in Figure 10. State i means that the number of
processes in ON stage is i. Let λ and µ be the arrival rates of OFF and ON stage
of each process, respectively. An arrival of OFF stage initiates a start of ON stage.
Since all processes begin at OFF stage, the transition rate from state 0 to state 1,
λ0, is nλ. More formally, the transition rate from state i to state i+1 is ai,i+1 = λi
= (n − i)λ > 0, and likewise ai+1,i = µi+1 = (i + 1)µ > 0 for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. We
obtain the probability of being in state i, Pi, by solving the balance equation λiPi =
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µi+1Pi+1 as shown in Equation 4.1.
Pi = P0
(
n
i
)(
λ
µ
)i
(4.1)
With Equation 4.1 and
∑n
i=0 Pi = 1, the probability of zero active process P0 can
be expressed as
P0 = 1/
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)(
λ
µ
)i
(4.2)
Using these equations, we can get a cumulative distribution function Fn(x) shown
in Equation 4.3. For any integer x (0 ≤ x ≤ n), Fn(x) represents the probability that
the random variable X is less than or equal to x.
Fn(x) = Pn(X ≤ x) =
x∑
i=0
Pi = P0
x∑
i=0
(
n
i
)(
λ
µ
)i
(4.3)
We can use this equation in two ways. First, we can estimate an SKC hit rate
p when a cache size x and the number of processes n are given. For example, when
λ = µ, x = 3, and n = 4, P0 = P4 =
1
16
, P1 = P3 =
1
4
, and P2 =
3
8
. We expect
that p will be at least 15
16
because
∑3
i=0 Pi =
15
16
. Second, we can also estimate n
that a cache of size x supports with a target p. n is referred to as cache capacity.
Similar to the previous example, if a target p is equal to 0.9, its cache capacity is 4
because
∑3
i=0 Pi =
15
16
> 0.9, and
∑3
i=0 Pi =
13
16
< 0.9 when λ = µ and n = 5. To CIC
architects, the latter usage will be more interesting because they can project the size
of a cluster system that a cache size under consideration can support with a target
SKC hit rate.
Note that in this model we implicitly assumed that a process communicates
with all other processes with an equal probability. According to [84], most processes
in many parallel applications including NAS benchmarks communicate with several
neighbors more frequently than the others, but there are also some processes that have
58
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
Entry BT SP LU FT CG MG
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f S
es
si
o
n
 
K
ey
s
2KB 4KB 8KB 16KB
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
Entry BT SP LU FT CG MG
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f S
es
si
o
n
 
K
ey
s
2KB 4KB 8KB 16KB
(a) SGI Origin 2000 (b) IBM SP-2
Fig. 11. Cache capacities of SKC for NAS benchmarks for target hit rate 0.9.
uniformly distributed destinations. Furthermore, [85] reported that there exist some
parallel applications whose processes communicate with all other processes equally.
To estimate cache capacities of real cluster systems, we use an analysis of NAS
parallel benchmarks running on an SGI Origin 2000 and an IBM SP-2 systems [51].
The analysis presented each benchmark’s average ON/OFF length (a reciprocal of
the arrival rate). We set p to 0.9 and x to 2, 4, 8, and 16-Kbyte caches. Since any
two communicating processes share a session key, a cache capacity directly represents
the total number of session keys that an SKC can support. Figure 11 shows cache
capacities for those benchmarks. In most cases, the cache capacities are much larger
than the number of cache entries represented as Entry. For example, in the SGI
Origin 2000, the cache capacity of 2KB SKC in BT benchmark is about 1000 while
its Entry is 128. This means that in BT benchmark SKC’s hit rate will be higher
than 90% until there are 1000 session keys. The capacity is quite surprising because
the 2KB SKC can hold up to 128 session keys. The reason for this is that the OFF
stage duration is at least several times longer than the ON stage duration. That is,
the number of processes that are simultaneously active is relatively small. Therefore,
we can expect that even a small SKC can support the communication with a fairly
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large number of processes with a high SKC hit rate. Some might think that there
will be few cluster systems that need thousands of sessions keys. However, according
to the supercomputer Top 500 list released in November 2007, the percentage of
supercomputers that have more than one thousand processors is 91%. Considering
that its percentage in November 2005 list was only 29%, the number of processors in
cluster systems will continue to increase quickly. Therefore, the large cache capacities
supported by a small SKC will be practical.
3. Coscheduling-Aware Prefetching Scheme
In order to maximize the cluster system’s overall throughput, researchers have pro-
posed coschedulers that can schedule physically distributed processes of a job to run
as concurrently as possible [54, 86, 55, 56]. If these coschedulers are used in clus-
ter systems, multiple processes are running on each cluster node and there will be
context switches inevitably. The problem of context switches is that SKC hit rates
will decrease because a newly scheduled process needs to use a completely different
set of session keys for communicating with whole different nodes. As a result, many
subsequent session key accesses for the new process will miss until its SKC warms
up. The best solution to this problem would be to synchronize the contents of SKC
according to scheduling decisions of the coscheduler. That is, when a coscheduler
picks a process to run next, the OS provides the CIC with the decision so that the
CIC can prefetch session keys for that process. But it will cause OS interventions and
additional communications between the OS and the CIC. Moreover, it will increase
the complexity of the CIC design for the synchronization. To solve this problem,
we propose a simple prefetching scheme that can synchronize SKC and coscheduling
decisions without OS interventions.
Before describing the prefetching scheme, we would like to begin with explaining
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why coschedulers are proposed and how they work. A drawback of batch scheduler
that assigns a number of processors to an application exclusively is the low CPU
utilization because a CPU often waits for I/O operations or messages. A simple
remedy is to assign multiple applications to each node by using a local scheduler.
However, since it does not consider the behavior of other processes running on other
nodes, one process would have to wait until the other process wakes up, resulting in
the low CPU utilization. In contrast, gang scheduler can explicitly run all processes
of a job at the same time [57, 58], but unfortunately it becomes quite complex in
large-scale cluster systems. To remove the above mentioned problems, researchers
proposed several communication-driven coscheduling schemes such as SB, DCS-SB,
and PB. These scheduling schemes are generally called implicit coscheduling because
a message arrival from a process in a remote node implicitly notices that the process
is running actively on the node. Its main benefit is that it still produces better CPU
utilization and throughput than the local scheduler while it does not need a complex
global control mechanism as in the gang scheduler [54, 55, 56]. In the SB [54], after a
process sends a message, it spins (or busy wait) for a fixed time before blocking itself,
hoping that a reply message arrives within the spinning time. The DCS-SB [55, 56]
acts like the SB except that, when a message arrives at a blocked process, it increases
the priority of the process. The PB [55] periodically boosts the priority of processes
that have unconsumed messages in a round-robin fashion.
Our prefetching scheme takes advantage of the fact that the aforementioned
implicit coschedulers use message arrivals as a hint for coscheduling. In other words,
if a message arrives at a process and the process is not occupying its CPU currently,
the CIC presumes that implicit schedulers will try to schedule the process soon. Based
on this, the CIC loads the process’s frequently used session keys to a prefetch buffer.
When a new message arrives, its session key can be found in the SKC if the message
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Fig. 12. Coscheduled cluster communication simulation platform.
belongs to the current process, or can be found in the prefetch buffer if the message is
for the new process. For this, a session key should be looked up in the SKC and the
prefetch buffer in parallel. If its session is found in the prefetch buffer, the session key
is moved to the SKC and one session key needs to be evicted from the SKC. At every
session key eviction, the CIC updates the list of frequently accessed session keys for
the process that the evicted session key belongs to. This operation can be done by
the embedded processor later, so the operation is not in the critical path.
D. Performance Evaluation
1. Simulation Platform
Figure 12 depicts the simulation platform for the coscheduled cluster communications.
Shaded rectangles represent what we developed, modified, or executed in this study.
We use NAS parallel benchmarks [87] that are widely used for measuring the system
performance in cluster/supercomputing environments. We first modified source codes
of the benchmarks to print all packets’ source and destination with a timestamp.
We ran the modified benchmarks on an SGI Altix 3700 consisting of 128 Itanium-2
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processors and 256-Gbyte main memory with a batch scheduler where each processor
is assigned to only one program at a time. Due to our network simulator’s cycle-
accuracy, we used the small problem size (Class A) of the benchmarks using 16
processors. In this problem size, IS and EP benchmarks produced too few traces to
be used in our simulator. We also dropped FT because it had a compiling problem
in our system environment. Therefore, we used the other five benchmarks: CG, SP,
MG, BT, and LU. Then, we converted the captured traces into a different format so
that our cluster network simulator can use the format as input.
Our cluster network simulator used in [52, 30, 53] includes packet-level switches
and CICs that are compliant with InfiniBand, one of the promising cluster inter-
connects. To simulate more realistic cluster communications, we made three major
changes to the simulator: timed simulation, coscheduling simulation, and cache simu-
lation. First, we developed a trace-driven cluster simulator by modifying the existing
cluster network simulator in which all packets were generated randomly with a cer-
tain distribution. An important requirement of the new simulator was that packet
injection time needs to be adjusted dynamically. This is because a packet may come
across a shorter or longer network path during simulation due to differences between
the simulated networks and the real networks. To apply these dynamics to simula-
tion, our simulator provides the relative-timed injection by maintaining the actual
time distance between two consecutive packets’ timestamps. In other words, let us
suppose that in a real execution a node receives and sends two packets at t and t+ i,
respectively. If the first event (packet arrival) occurs at t′ during simulation, then the
second event (packet injection) should be scheduled at t′ + i. This timed injection
prevents unrealistically early or late packet injections. Because of this effect, the sim-
ulated execution time of the benchmarks is different from the actual execution time
in the real system as shown in Table IV.
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Table IV. Original and simulated execution time of NAS benchmarks
Time (sec) CG MG LU SP BT
Original 3.72 11.86 268.61 244.12 291.73
Simulation 3.85 12.80 257.85 233.90 278.40
Second, to simulate a cluster system in which multiple applications are competing
for network and computing resources, we implemented a Linux local scheduler and
four coschedulers: SB, DCS-SB, PB, and gang. The Linux local scheduler is the same
as the one in the Linux kernel 2.6. The simulation parameters of each coscheduler
are the followings: the spinning time for SB and DCS-SB is 750 µs, a regular priority
boost in PB occurs every 2 ms, and the interval of the gang scheduling is 20 ms. All
the parameters are optimized through multiple simulations, and other implementation
issues are described in [86, 55].
Third, to simulate the SKC, we also implemented a cache simulator in the CIC.
Before sending and after receiving a packet, the CIC checks its SKC to see whether
the necessary session key is cached. If found, it takes only a cache access time to read
the session key, but, if not, a memory access time will be consumed. In Figure 12,
we draw the three simulators (coscheduler simulator, cache simulator, and cluster
network simulator) separately for better understanding, but in fact they are integrated
into the cluster network simulator.
Additionally, we developed a synthetic packet generator and a cache simulator to
simulate the analytical ON/OFF traffic model of NAS parallel benchmarks explained
in Section 2. Note that, since we are interested in the SKC hit rate, we use only the
sequence of packet arrivals, not the interval between packet arrivals. The benefit of
this simulation is to overcome the time limitation in simulating a large number of
long-running processes in a short simulation time, which would be impossible in a
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cycle-accurate simulator.
Finally, there are several important simulation parameters. A GCM implementa-
tion presented in [82] requires 12 cycles to encrypt/decrypt the first 128-bit block and
one cycle for each additional block with last two cycles to generate an authentication
tag. If a 256-byte packet is in use, the additional delay is 30 cycles in sending or
receiving a packet. Since this delay needs to occur both in a sender and in a receiver,
the total additional one-way delay is 60 cycles that are converted to approximately
220 ns with 270MHz. According to the CACTI model, the cache access time of a
16-Kbyte fully associative cache is 3 ns. An access time to an external memory in a
CIC is set to 2.5 µs, as measured in [88].
2. Effectiveness of SKC
Figure 13(a) compares the average network latencies of several configurations of each
NAS benchmark. The reason why we compare the network latencies is that, since all
security operations are done in the CIC, the security overhead will be reflected in the
network latency. NoSecurity represents the original configuration without a security
function enabled. NoSKC represents the configuration where encryption/decryption
and authentication are enabled but the SKC does not exist. SKC -n configurations
have n entries in the SKC. Compared with NoSecurity, NoSKC has around 160
percent overhead on the network latency because each packet requires an external
memory access for retrieving a session key. In contrast, SKC-6 reduces the overhead
by 50 percent on average from NoSKC, adding 29 percent overhead to NoSecurity
configuration. The SKC hit rates of CG and LU shown in Figure 13(b) are almost
100 percent, showing little difference in the network latencies of SKC -n configurations
in Figure 13(a). However, other benchmarks have relatively low hit rates in small
SKCs, resulting in longer network latency. Therefore, we can say that the higher SKC
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Fig. 13. Performance comparisons of network latency of single application execution.
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hit rate is positively related to the shorter network latency.
Figure 13(c) compares the benchmark completion time of the above configura-
tions. In contrast to our expectation, it does not seem that the big difference in the
network latency has a big impact on the overall application completion time. The
similar trend was reported by [89], explaining that many cluster applications are in-
sensitive to the network latency, even though some are sensitive. This implies that
NAS parallel benchmarks are not much sensitive to the network latency. However, we
believe that there are some applications that can get a great benefit from the short
network latency. For example, real-time multimedia applications used in a remote
surgery need quick responses as well as strong security on each packet. Considering
that cluster systems are being deployed for diverse applications, it will be useful to
minimize the additional network latency while providing fine-grained security. Fig-
ure 13(d) shows the completion time and the network latency of CG with various
packet lengths. Since the latency is measured till the last flit of a packet arrives at
its destination, the average latency also increases as the length of a packet increases.
Note that the network latency of SKC is similar to that of NoSecurity, but shorter
than that of NoSKC.
We also investigate the effectiveness of the SKC in providing cluster systems
with Internet security services such as TLS. Although those services can be done
by firewall, front-end routers, or host CPUs, the CIC with security hardware can
provide or at least help the services more efficiently, minimizing possible performance
overhead to other cluster components. For this, we fed the Worldcup 98 Web traffic
into our simulator. We choose the traces of June 10, 1998, the day of the final
match of the Worldcup, and randomly select an around 90-second-long trace for
simulation. The number of packets is about 20,000. Node 0 acts as a distributor to
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(a) Completion time & latency (b) Interarrival distribution
Fig. 14. Worldcup 98 Web traffic simulation.
forward web requests to other nodes according to their source IP addresses†. A simple
modulo operation is used for deciding a destination node so that packets having the
same IP address are forwarded to the same node for high SKC hit rate. When a
destination node receives a packet, it sends a reply message to Node 0 with a static
web request processing delay that is set to 1.3 ms, which is empirically measured in
one of our department’s web servers. Figure 14(a) shows a similar result as those of
NAS benchmarks; the completion times are almost similar, but the SKC minimizes
the additional network latency. The average SKC hit rate is 77.2 percent with a four-
entry SKC. Considering that the number of distinct IP addresses is around 1,200
in the trace, the small SKC yields quite a high SKC hit rate. To understand this
effect, we analyze inter-arrival time of the trace, the time duration between two
consecutive packets originated from the same IP address. Figure 14(b) shows that
most of consecutive packets from the same node arrive within a very short time period.
This high temporal locality is the reason for the high SKC hit rate. Therefore, even a
small SKC will have a high hit rate for any cluster applications whose traffic patterns
†Due to privacy concerns, real IP addresses are not available in the trace. However,
a client ID that the authors use as a requester’s identifier is mapped into a unique IP
address. Therefore, an IP address and its client ID can be used interchangeably.
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Fig. 15. Performance gain from prefetch buffer on various coschedulers.
have a high temporal locality.
3. Effectiveness of Prefetching
To make workloads for the coscheduling environment, we assign a mix of several NAS
parallel benchmark traces to a node so that a scheduler of the node coschedules the
traces. Figure 15 shows the overall performance of all coschedulers in terms of network
latency and completion time. Each workload uses 15 NAS benchmarks traces: three
instances per each of the five benchmarks. The number of entries in the SKC is 10,
and the prefetch buffer can hold eight session keys. In Figure 15(a), Prefetch reduces
network latency by 5 percent on average. This performance gain mainly comes from
around 13 percent hit rate increase in Prefetch. However, it is still hard to tell that the
shorter latency always enhances the performance in terms of total completion time
based on our simulation results shown in Figure 15(b). Among coschedulers, DCS-SB
and SB have the shortest completion time, and Local the longest, which is similar
to the results in other literature [86, 55]. In the same coscheduler, most completion
times are similar except for PB; contrary to our expectation, NoSKC ’s completion
time is even shorter than completion times of other configurations. The main reason
for this is that even a subtle difference in the network latency changes the scheduling
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(c) pref. buf. = 2, (Gang) (d) SKC = 5,20 (Gang)
Fig. 16. Performance comparison on varying size of SKC and prefetch buffer.
order of a node, and this change has a chain effect, thus resulting in a completely
different scheduling order in the whole cluster system. In our simulation environment,
the variability of scheduling orders seems bigger than that of the performance gain
from the prefetching scheme, especially in terms of completion time. However, we
believe that the shorter network latency will help improve the overall performance in
the long term.
Figure 16 describes how the network latency and the SKC hit rate are affected
by the changes in the size of the SKC and the prefetch buffer. The SKC hit rate
encompasses all hits both on the SKC and on the prefetch buffer. In Figure 16(a),
we fix the size of the prefetch buffer to two, and increase the size of SKC. DCS-
SB is used as the coscheduler in this simulation. We compare two cases: one with
a prefetch buffer (/w) and the other without it (w/o). As expected, the latency
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decreases and the SKC hit rate increases with the increasing size of SKC. Note that,
with a bigger size of the SKC, the additional gain from the prefetch buffer is slightly
decreased. This is because more session keys residing in a big SKC yields more hits on
the SKC, consequently reducing hits on the prefetch buffer. Therefore, the prefetch
buffer is more useful when the size of SKC is small. Figure 16(b) depicts how the
SKC performance varies as the size of the prefetch buffer increases, with two different
sizes of SKC, 5 and 20. In case of a 20-entry SKC, although the size of the prefetch
buffer becomes big enough to contain more sets of prefetched sessions keys of previous
SKC misses, the effect of old prefetched session keys is diminishing gradually. In the
figure, although the prefetch buffer size increases by eight times from 1 to 8, there is
a small performance gain, 0.17 µs in the latency and 2.8 percent in the SKC hit rate.
All other schedulers except the gang scheduler showed the similar trend, so they are
omitted in this paper.
Figure 16(c) and Figure 16(d) show the gang scheduler’s results. To our surprise,
as the size of the SKC reaches around 15, neither a prefetch buffer nor a larger SKC
improves network latency. This is related to how the gang scheduler coschedules mul-
tiple applications. The gang scheduler usually makes all processes of an application
in multiple nodes run concurrently, and then it moves to the next application after
a fixed time-slice. Since all applications are executed in order, the session keys used
by the previous application will not be used for a long time. In other words, once
the size of the SKC becomes large enough to hold all session keys of an application,
its hit rate will not increase much. This is why the increase in the SKC hit rate in
Figure 16(c) is minimal. For the same reason, larger prefetch buffers make little dif-
ference in the network latency and the SKC hit rate as shown in Figure 16(d). From
the above results, we conclude that the effect of the prefetch buffer varies according
to the size of SKC and coscheduling policy.
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(a) SGI Origin 2000 (b) IBM SP-2
Fig. 17. Cache hit rate of NAS benchmarks on a 16-KByte SKC.
4. SKC Size
To simulate the SKC behavior on a large-scale cluster system, the synthetic packet
generator increases the total number of session keys in one CIC from 1,000 to 10,000.
Although it is quite improbable for one process to communicate with 10,000 processes
at the same time, this simulation can show how a small SKC withstands such extreme
loads. The communication pattern between two processes follows the ON/OFF model
as described in [51]. In Figure 17(a) and Figure 17(b), the 16-Kbyte SKC shows
relatively high hit rates in most benchmarks, except for FT in SGI Origin 2000,
and FT, CG, and MG in IBM SP-2. The reason for the exceptions is that the
cache capacities of the benchmarks are less than 10,000 session keys as shown in
Figure 11. It is noteworthy to point out that LU has a little lower hit rates, even
with a large cache capacity in Figure 11. The reason for this is that LU has 10∼100
times shorter ON and OFF durations than those of other benchmarks, which means
that communicating processes are alternating frequently, thus resulting in lower SKC
hit rate. Still, we can say that a high cache capacity is strongly and positively related
to a high SKC hit rate. If a large fully associative cache causes space and speed
problems, we suggest that the CIC has a 16-way or 32-way SKC instead of a fully
associative cache because they show similar results to that of the fully associative
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SKC.
E. Related Work
There has been some research to improve security inside clusters. An early study [11]
presented security enhancement methods for system area networks. [10] showed that
encryption can be used in clusters with a minimal performance impact. [8] proposed
the distributed security infrastructure (DSI) to supports a fine-grained cluster-wide
security enforcement by providing a process-level resource and access control. [6]
identified security characteristics unique to clusters. NVisionCC [90] was presented
to enhance the security inside cluster systems by monitoring processes across cluster
nodes. [91] proposed an instant attack stopper (IAS) scheme to instantly block inside
attackers in InfiniBand cluster systems. Recently, [48] pointed out security vulnera-
bilities of InfiniBand and proposed a security framework that can be easily integrated
into its specifications.
Some recent work has focused on the performance gain by use of the security
coprocessor on real systems. [80] analyzed the relative cost of network security proto-
cols, and advocated that the dedicated cryptographic hardware can make any security
protocols practically viable. [78] investigated the performance overhead of TLS web
servers using the host processor and the security coprocessor approaches. Due to the
limited performance gain by the security coprocessor, they concluded that an addi-
tional host processor would be more beneficial than the security coprocessor. [81]
presented an OpenBSD cryptographic framework. It contains a cryptographic API
to provide a uniform access to various cryptographic hardware, thus enabling the
high utilization of the hardware. [92] found that cryptographic hardware attached to
I/O bus would not improve security performance due to the severe bus contention,
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and then the authors proposed a scheme similar to the CIC approach, but they left
out detailed performance evaluation. Several network adapters equipped with cryp-
tographic hardware are available in the market [93, 94, 95]. However, since they were
not developed for the ULC of cluster systems, and their detailed architecture is not
publicly available, it is difficult to directly compare them with our approach.
F. Conclusions
This study proposed an architectural support to enable fine-grained secure communi-
cations in coscheduled cluster systems with low performance overhead. The important
conclusions of this study are the followings. First, we advocated the CIC approach
because it incurs virtually no performance overhead to the host CPU and no addi-
tional PCI transactions, while retaining the performance benefit of the ULC through
bypassing the host CPU.
Second, to support fine-grained security, we proposed an SKC inside the CIC
to store recently accessed session keys. If the communication pattern of a cluster
application shows a high temporal locality, most of session key accesses will be found
in the SKC, thus incurring little performance overhead in managing the fine-grained
session keys. Simulation results showed that network latency is reduced by 50 percent
on average, compared with non-SKC configurations.
Third, to further increase the SKC hit rate, we proposed a prefetch buffer to fetch
session keys from memory ahead of time by predicting the job scheduler’s decision. We
implemented the Linux local scheduler and four coschedulers including SB, DCS-SB,
PB, and gang scheduler. Simulation results showed that the prefetch buffer reduces
network latency by 5 percent on average from that of SKC-only configurations.
Fourth, we constructed an analytical model to estimate the number of concurrent
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processes that can be supported by a given size of SKC. The model showed that even
a 16-Kbyte SKC yields a high hit rate even when managing thousands of session keys.
We are currently examining a number of possible extensions to this study. First,
we are investigating the reason for the insensitive completion time. Second, we plan
to implement the proposed architecture on a reconfigurable NIC. Finally, we are
exploring other design alternatives to incorporate more security features in the CIC
such as fast attack detection and response.
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CHAPTER V
DESIGN OF SECURE SHARED MULTIPROCESSOR SYSTEM∗
A. Introduction
Recent malicious attacks to many research/commercial servers have made protection
and security essential requirements in all computer systems. Especially, server systems
operated by institutes dealing with highly confidential data such as banks, military,
or government agents need absolute security because even one incident of information
leakage could result in very serious problems. Therefore, those institutes should seek
effective schemes to prevent/block any possible security attacks on their computer
systems. Considering that most of recent server systems have multiple processors
and share single or distributed memory, we believe that there should be appropriate
protections on the memory and communications betweeen processors. Moreover, since
performance compromise should be the last resort in the server systems, any security
schemes free of performance overhead are much desirable despite additional hardware
costs.
There are two types of possible attacks: software and physical attacks. Software
attacks exploit software vulnerabilities of the operating system (OS) and server appli-
cations such as web and database services. Buffer overflow attack is a good example
[96]. Physical attacks that are our focus capture or modify data from the system
memory or system bus through external devices physically attached to the system.
Although high-end servers are often assumed to be secure against such physical at-
∗Reprinted with permission from “I2SEMS: Interconnects-Independent Security
Enhanced Shared Memory Multiprocessor Systems” by Manhee Lee, Minseon Ahn,
and Eun Jung Kim, 2007. Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Par-
allel Architecture and Compilation Techniques (PACT), pp. 94-103, Copyright 2007
IEEE.
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tacks, that assumption cannot be sustained in many situations; it is possible that
inside personnel turn against their organization to steal data, and, moreover, there
exist real snooping devices that are attachable to system buses [97, 98]. To miti-
gate the physical attacks, memory encryption and authentication have been widely
investigated for uniprocessor systems [59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66]. However, the
uniprocessor security models are not sufficient to design secure multiprocessor systems
due to the absence of cache-to-cache communication protection.
When multiple processors share data, a cache coherence protocol guarantees data
consistency among caches. Without protecting cache-to-cache communication, mem-
ory protection would be useless. A few studies raised this question and provided fast
encryption and authentication techniques that can be deployed on bus-based shared
memory multiprocessors [14, 13]. One common feature in the studies is that a bus
sequence number that counts every message on a shared bus is used as a counter
to generate an encrypted counter, called keystream [99]. Since all communications
on the shared bus are broadcasted to all processors, they can predict the next bus
sequence number to generate the same keystream in advance, thus turning a complex
encryption/decryption operation into a simple XOR (eXclusive OR) operation. How-
ever, since the above schemes are dependent on the shared bus, they cannot be easily
extended to general multiprocessor systems having different underlying networks or
distributed shared memory [100, 101].
A recent study by Rogers, et al. proposed a novel mechanism for protecting
cache-to-cache communication in distributed shared memory (DSM) multiprocessors
as a remedy for this problem [67]. However, since their design focused on the directory-
based cache coherence protocol used for the point-to-point communication, their idea
cannot be directly applied to the systems with other cache coherence protocols used
for multicasting/broadcasting communication such as the token coherence protocol
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[102, 103]. For example, even in the directory-based cache coherence protocol, a
multicast network is reported to improve system performance by up to 18 percent
because the invalidation time is lessened by sending a multicast message to invalidate
multiple cache blocks instead of sending multiple messages sequentially [104, 105, 106].
To provide diverse multiprocessor architectures with a more general security
model, we propose an interconnect independent and cache coherence protocol inde-
pendent security model for shared memory multiprocessor systems, referred to as
Interconnects-Independent Security Enhanced Shared Memory Multiprocessor Sys-
tem (I2SEMS). To our best knowledge, I2SEMS is the first attempt to support the
protection of shared memory multiprocessor systems without any restrictions on com-
munication types and cache coherence protocols.
Our main idea is that a Global Counter Controller (GCC) assigns counters upon
a request from a processor and broadcasts the assignment to the other processors.
When receiving the counter assignment, processors generate the counters’ keystreams
and store them in a keystream queue or a keystream pool, depending on whether the
keystream will be used for encryption or decryption. To minimize the use of new
counters, a keystream cache stores both counters and keystreams so that it can re-
use them only when the re-use is safe; the same counter and its keystream can be
used for the same data block securely. With this architectural support, I2SEMS can
minimize enryption/decryption delay by providing timely available keystreams as well
as protect communications by guaranteeing that different blocks never use the same
counter.
We implemented I2SEMS by using Simics along with Wisconsin multifacet Gen-
eral Execution-driven Multiprocessor Simulator (GEMS) in a hierarchical switched
network [107, 108]. GEMS is a set of modules for Virtutech Simics to enable detailed
cache, memory, and interconnection simulations. We use SPLASH-2 benchmarks
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and one SPEC OMP benchmark for workloads on up to 16-processor shared mem-
ory multiprocessors [109, 110]. Simulation results show that the overall performance
slowdown is 4 percent on average, and the keystream pool hit rate is as high as 78
percent, meaning that 78 percent of incoming messages are decrypted without de-
lay. Furthermore, we observed that, due to the re-use of keystreams through the
keystream cache, the increase of counter management related messages seems almost
static compared to that of total messages especially in 16-processor multiprocessor
systems. Based on this observation, we believe that I2SEMS will be scalable to much
larger multiprocessor systems.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section B explains Ga-
lois/Counter mode and describes how the previous studies provided secure computing
models in uni/multiprocessor systems. In Section C, we explain our security model
and its design in detail. Security analysis and simulation results are presented in
Sections D and E, followed by the concluding remarks in Section F.
B. Secure Computing Models
In this section, we describe our threat model, and explain how the previous works
provided secure computing in uni/multiprocessor systems.
1. Threat Model
Before enhancing security of a system, it is necessary to classify secure and insecure
components in the system. Processing core, registers, caches, and control and data
paths in a processor are considered to be secure. We assume that memory and I/O
controllers are secure, while other off-chip components including memory, memory
bus, and I/O devices are insecure. We also assume that interconnection networks
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that connect multiple processors and memory banks are insecure.
Through these insecure components, the following physical attacks are possible.
First, any wiretapping device attached to memory bus or interconnection network can
get information about memory transactions and processor-to-processor communica-
tions. Since in many cases cables of the interconnection network are exposed to the
outside of the system to connect multiple nodes packaged in one or several racks, they
are vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. To make servers resistant to this attack, it
is necessary to provide the confidentiality service where all communications from pro-
cessors are encrypted. Second, assuming that attackers are much more determined
and well equipped, they can further inject or modify messages to the systems. This
attack includes injecting new data messages, modifying data in messages in transit,
and replaying old messages. To prevent this attack, the authentication service needs
to make sure that all data messages are genuine, not spoofed, modified, or replayed
by illegal devices. Third, in some cases attackers may intend to undermine the avail-
ability of the systems by keeping injecting garbage messages. These messages will be
finally discarded since authentication information will not be correct. but they will
have negative effects on the system performance because of possible congestion that
would occur in interconnection network or controllers for cache and memory. This is
similar to the denial of service attack in the Internet. However, this attack does not
seem much attractive to attackers not only because attackers get little benefit from
the attack, but also because a sudden performance drop or a system crash would lead
to a thorough search for attached devices. Therefore, the availability service is not
our focus. From now on, we will give an overview how the previous research provided
the confidentiality and authentication services in uniprocessor and multiprocessor
systems.
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2. Uniprocessor Secure Model
Several uniprocessor memory authentication schemes were proposed in [59, 61, 64, 65].
XOM (eXecute Only Memory) uses MAC to verify each memory block’s integrity [61].
MAC for each block cannot defend against replay attacks where a hacker gets a valid
memory block and keeps resending it. Gassend, et al. proposed a hash tree to guar-
antee the integrity of the whole contents of memory [59]. While it removes the replay
attacks, a hash-tree has relatively high run-time overhead because it should check
memory integrity for every memory access with a logarithmic number of integrity
checks. To overcome this performance overhead, Suh, et al. suggested that MAC
verifies a series of memory operations using multiset hashing functions, resulting in
only 5 percent performance slowdown [64]. Moreover, Yan, et al., who first introduced
GCM to this research area, minimized authentication overhead by authenticating all
necessary levels of a hash tree in parallel [65].
For uniprocessor memory encryption, early studies used ECB mode [61, 63], but
later Counter mode was adopted for performance reasons [62, 64, 65, 66, 111]. In the
uniprocessor secure computing model, decryption speed is more critical than encryp-
tion speed because decryption should be performed quickly so that the processor can
use it for execution as early as possible. In contrast, the encryption delay of evicted
data is not time-critical because the data is first written in a write buffer and later
stored back to memory.
To speed up decryption, Yang, et al. suggested using an additional cache to store
counters [64, 66]. While a processor is waiting for a reply after sending a request to
memory, it can precompute a keystream by using a stored counter. To alleviate
this cache space overhead, a prediction scheme proposed by Shi, et al. precomputes
incremental counters by utilizing the principle of locality in memory access patterns
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[62]. With an optimization scheme, they can predict keystreams with up to 99 percent
accuracy. Yan, et al. combines encryption and authentication using GCM, resulting
in 5 percent performance overhead [65].
3. Multiprocessor Secure Model
For multiprocessor shared-memory protection, it is possible to apply uniprocessor
security schemes, but cache-to-cache communications need a different protection
scheme. Unlike uniprocessor secure computing models, encryption and generation
of MAC in multiprocessor systems become time-critical because a receiving processor
may stall to wait for a reply. As for authentication of cache-to-cache communications,
Shi, et al. proposed an authentication speculation execution to remove MAC latency
from the critical path [14]. In this scheme, while the receiver verifies an incoming
message, it continues to execute speculatively by using un-authenticated data. Those
executions are committed only after all operands become authenticated. This scheme
reduces performance overhead by overlapping authentication and CPU execution.
However, each processor needs a complex speculation circuit, and this scheme is still
vulnerable to replay attacks. Zhang, et al. used Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode
in which the previous MAC is used to make the next MAC, thus preventing replay
attacks [13].
Rogers, et al. pointed out the limitation of above schemes on DSM systems
and proposed an efficient data protection design [67]. By focusing on point-to-point
communications of the directory-based cache coherence protocol, they were able to
utilize DSM systems’ temporal locality of communications, which means a processor
communicates with a relatively small number of neighboring processors in a short
period of time. Such locality makes it possible for each processor to have a small
table to hold counters, resulting in good scalability.
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Please note that, in multiprocessor shared-memory protection, all processors and
related components like the memory controller need to share the same secret key. This
key can be fabricated inside processors and a memory controller from factory, or a
runtime distribution method is available as described in [112]. Since we assume that
processors and the memory controller are secure, capturing, snooping, or predicting
the secret key is impossible. Furthermore, even if an ASIC or FPGA is hooked up
to the system and pretends to be a peer processor in the multiprocessor systems, it
cannot break the privacy and integrity of the system since it is practically impossible
for the illegal device to have the same secret key.
C. Architectural Design of I2SEMS
In this section, we focus on the architectural design of I2SEMS providing contiguous
counters so that it is easy to predict the next counters. First, we discuss design
considerations of I2SEMS. Then, we present the design overview of I2SEMS, followed
by detailed explanation on each component.
1. Design Considerations for I2SEMS
In this section, we provide the rationale behind the current I2SEMS design. The
first design consideration is to decide whether messages should carry counters. In
previous studies on secure bus-based systems [14, 13], cache-to-cache messages do
not carry counters because receiving processors can always correctly predict the next
counter. However, such strict global synchronization is almost impossible in general
shared memory systems. Therefore, although it will incur additional overhead, in
our scheme each message carries its own counter. The overhead will be different
depending on implementation of interconnection networks. For example, if a wide
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channel bus is used, an extra channel is necessary. In a network using serial links, the
message serialization latency will be increased by the time to serialize the counter.
The second design consideration is to decide whether to maintain multiple local
counters or one global counter. In the local counter management, the whole counter
range is divided into exclusive subranges that are assigned to the processors so that
each processor manages its own local counter, without worrying about the dupli-
cate use of the same counter. A disadvantage of this management is that adjacent
blocks would have discontinuous counters, when multiple processors share and up-
date those blocks. This discontinuity will result in slow decryption since predicting
the next counter, based on the current memory block’s counter, is often incorrect.
In the global counter management, in contrast, a central counter controller assigns
counters upon a counter request, thus resulting in relatively contiguous counters.
To improve both counter continuity and prediction correctness, the global counter
management is desirable, and thus we propose GCC. Since a request to the GCC
should be made early enough to finish generating new keystreams before their usage,
a keystream queue is necessary to hold the precomputed keystreams. A completely
different design alternative without using counters is possible by encrypting and au-
thenticating messages in all point-to-point links. However, this approach incurs ad-
ditional encryption/authentication delay per hop, thus increasing the total network
delay significantly in large networks. Power/energy consumption will also increase
linearly depending on the number of hop counts. Therefore, this approach will not
be suitable for the multiprocessor environment.
The third design consideration is to decide whether to use counters persistently
or compulsorily. In the persistent scheme, each processor always uses new counters
to encrypt cache blocks regardless of their cache status. Most of previous studies
consume counters in this way. However, we can make use of the fact that it is not
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necessary to use new counters all the time because a previously used counter can
be re-used securely if a cache block has not been changed since the first use of the
counter. We refer to this as compulsory scheme. The benefit of this scheme is that it
will consume less number of counters than the persistent scheme, thus reducing the
number of counter request messages. This is why I2SEMS stores used counters and
keystreams in a keystream cache.
The last consideration is to decide when and how to start counter prediction:
responsive or broadcast counter prediction. In the responsive prediction, a receiving
processor starts to predict subsequent counters only after the processor receives a
message carrying a counter. A similar approach was introduced in the uniprocessor
prediction scheme [62]. The prediction correctness drops inevitably in data sharing
intensive applications because it is hard to predict which counter will be used next.
However, since we use the global counter management, a counter request to the GCC
hints that the requesting processor is actively consuming new counters and likely to
use the newly assigned counters shortly. In the broadcast counter prediction, the GCC
broadcasts the global counter to all other processors, and the processors precompute
keystreams based on the global counter. Although there is no guarantee that messages
carrying the new counters will arrive at the processors, if so, the prediction correctness
will increase. Since the responsive and broadcast schemes are orthogonal to each
other, we choose both of them to increase a prediction hit rate. To store these
precomputed keystreams, we use a keystream pool in each processor.
2. Design Overview of I2SEMS
Figure 18 shows the architecture of I2SEMS and its data flow. The system-wide GCC
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Fig. 18. I2SEMS security model.
is located in the memory controller†. In addition to a unified L2 cache, called System
Cache, each processor has a keystream queue, a keystream cache, and a keystream
pool. The GCC assigns counters upon a request from a processor and broadcasts
the assignment to the other processors. Keystreams in the keystream queue and the
keystream cache are used to encrypt outgoing messages, while those in the keystream
pool to decrypt incoming messages. Explanations on data flow between components
are in the followings.
When a processor transmits a data block to other caches or memory as shown
in Figure 18 (3) and (6), it needs to encrypt the block. If the cache block is modified
or exclusively owned by the processor, a new counter and its keystream are popped
†Depending on the location of the memory controller, the GCC can reside off or on
chip. When a processor has an off-chip memory controller like most Intel processors, a
multiprocessor system using such processors will have the GCC in its off-chip memory
controller usually located in the north bridge (or Memory Controller Hub). However,
some recent processors such as IBM’s POWER5 and AMD’s Athlon 64 and Opteron
processors have the on-chip memory controller for faster memory access. In this
case, by enabling one processor’s GCC, a single GCC will be located in an integrated
on-chip memory controller.
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from the keystream queue to encrypt the cache block. In many cases, the cache status
changes to Owned, which means that this processor is in charge of replying requests
that other processors send to get this block’s copy. In this status, the previously
used counter and keystream can be re-used because the data did not change. For
this purpose, after using the new counter and its keystream, we store them in the
keystream cache. Therefore, when a cache block that will be transmitted has the
Owned status, the processor looks up the keystream cache. If not found, a new counter
and its keystream need to be popped from the keystream queue. This operation is
described in Algorithm 1 (3) and (6).
[t]
( 1 )
( EncryptedDataBlock , counter ) = Memory . read ( address ) ;
Send ( address , EncryptedDataBlock , counter ) ;
(2 )
( address , EncryptedDataBlock , counter ) = Receive ( ) ;
Memory . wr i t e ( address , EncryptedDataBlock , counter ) ;
( 3 , 6 )
( DataBlock , counter , Keystream , s ta tu s ) = SystemCache . Read( address ) ;
i f ( isNewKeystreamNecessary ( s t a tu s ) ) {
( counter , Keystream ) = KeystreamQueue . pop ( ) ;
Send ( address , DataBlock ˆ Keystream , counter ) ;
KeystreamCache . s t o r e ( counter , Keystream ) ;}
e l s e i f ( KeystreamCace . IsKeystreamPresent ( counter ) ) {
( counter , Keystream ) = KeystreamCache . read ( counter ) ;
Send ( address , DataBlock ˆ Keystream , counter ) ;}
e l s e {( counter , Keystream ) = KeystreamQueue . pop ( ) ;
Send ( address , DataBlock ˆ Keystream , counter ) ;
KeystreamCache . s t o r e ( counter , Keystream ) ;}
( 4 , 5 )
i f ( Data block a r r i v ed ) {
( address , EncryptedDataBlock , counter ) = Receive ( ) ;
PARALLEL {
// Generate p Keystreams from counter to counter + p ˆ 1
counter [ 0 , . . . , p−1] = { counter , . . . , counter+p−1};
Keystream [ 0 , . . . , p−1] = AES( counter [ 0 , . . . , p−1 ] , s e c r e tk ey ) ;
KeystreamPool . s t o r e ( counter [ 1 , . . . , p−1 ] , Keystream [ 1 , . . . , p−1]) ;}
PARALLEL {
i f ( KeystreamPool . IsKeystreamPresent ( counter ) ) {
Keystream = KeystreamPool . read ( counter ) ;
DataBlock = EncryptedDataBlock ˆ Keystream ;
SystemCache . s t o r e ( address , DataBlock ) ;
KeystreamPool . d e l e t e ( counter ) ;}
e l s e { // wait un t i l f o r an AES la tency
DataBlock = EncryptedDataBlock ˆ Keystream [ 0 ] ;
SystemCache . s t o r e ( address , DataBlock ) ; } } }
e l s e i f (GCC rep ly a r r i v ed ) {
( counter ) = Receive ( ) ;
counter [ 0 , . . . , CR−1] = { counter−CR+ 1 , . . . , counter } ;
Keystream [ 0 , . . . , CR−1] = AES( counter [ 0 , . . . , CR−1 ] , s e c r e tkey ) ;
KeystreamQueue . enqueue ( counter [ 0 , . . . , CR−1 ] , Keystream [ 0 , . . . , CR−1]) ;}
e l s e i f (GCC broadcast a r r i v ed ) {
( counter ) = Receive ( ) ;
counter [ 0 , . . . , CR−1] = { counter−CR+ 1 , . . . , counter } ;
Keystream [ 0 , . . . , CR−1] = AES( counter [ 0 , . . . , CR−1 ] , s e c r e tkey ) ;
KeystreamPool . s t o r e ( counter [ 0 , . . . , CR−1 ] , Keystream [ 0 , . . . , CR−1 ] ) ; }
Algorithm 1. Pseudocode for I2SEMS security model
When a processor receives a data block as shown in Figure 18 (4) and (5), it
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tries to find a keystream in the keystream pool. Simultaneously it begins to generate
p keystreams by using the pipelining ability of AES logic. If found in the keystream
pool, referred to as a keystream hit, the counter’s keystream is used to decrypt the
arrived message. If not found, called a keystream miss, the keystream will be available
in an AES latency because the keystream generation already started regardless of
keystream hit or miss. All generated keystreams except the first one are stored in the
keystream pool, hoping that subsequent counters may be used in the near future. p
is called prediction depth and set to five as default. The impact of deep prediction
depth on performance is analyzed in Section 5.
When the remaining number of keystreams in the keystream queue becomes less
than counter reserve (CR), it sends a request to the GCC to get new counters. CR
is the number of counters that the GCC assigns at a time. More details on CR
are described in Section 3. Upon arrival, the GCC assigns and sends new counters
to the requesting processor. The GCC also broadcasts the assignment to the other
processors for them to precompute the counters’ keystreams. When a GCC reply or
a broadcast message arrives at a processor in (4) and (5), the processor generates the
CR number of keystreams and store them in the keystream queue or the keystream
pool, respectively. This operation is summarized in Algorithm 1 (4) and (5). All
other operations shown in Figure 18 are also described in Algorithm 1.
3. GCC and Keystream Queue
Since the GCC and the keystream queue work interactively to enable the efficient
counter assignment, we explain two components together. Figure 19 shows the detail
architecture of keystream queue, keystream cache, and keystream pool in I2SEMS.
When a data block is to be transmitted, the cache status bits select one keystream
from the keystream queue or the keystream cache. Since the system cache and the
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keystream cache are accessed in parallel, the access time to the keystream cache is
not in the critical path. Note that I2SEMS checks the cache block status only, which
means I2SEMS works independently of any cache coherence protocol as long as the
protocol changes cache block status correctly.
To prevent a situation where the keystream queue has no available keystreams,
it sends a request to the GCC early enough to guarantee the keystreams’ availability
all the time. Appropriate counter request timing is closely related to the number of
messages that the processor can send in a round trip time to the GCC. Equation 5.1
defines CR formally where R is the round trip time to the GCC, O is the keystream
generation delay, M is the cache block size, and B is the network bandwidth. If the
number of remaining keystreams become less than CR, the keystream queue sends a
request to the GCC. To decrease the number of requests, the GCC assigns a block of
counters per request instead of one counter. We suggest that the size of the block be
also CR because the keystream queue can send only one request when the number
of remaining counters becomes less than CR. Thus, the size of the keystream queue
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only needs to be large enough to hold 2 ∗ CR keystreams and counters.
R +O ≤
CR ∗M
B
CR ≥
B
M
∗ (R +O) (5.1)
Possible security problems on messages to and from the GCC will be discussed in
Section D. Besides security problems of the GCC, its scalability could be a problem
since I2SEMS has only one GCC. There are three possible problems; long latency
between processors and the GCC, bottleneck of the GCC, and high traffic overhead
of broadcasting of counters. The long latency problem can be solved by adjusting
CR. In Equation 5.1, the increased R will change CR so that it will guarantee the
availability of keystreams in the keystream queue. As for the bottleneck problem of
the GCC, since the GCC performs simple operations such as managing a counter
and replying to processors, the GCC will not be a bottleneck in communications.
If the underlying network does not support broadcasting or multicasting, the GCC
should generate and send all messages one by one, possibly causing some delays in
broadcasting. However, this delay will not be much critical to performance because
the newly assigned counters are not needed until the requesting processor uses up
all (CR-1) keystreams. Moreover, as we will show in Section 6, the total number of
requests to the GCC and its broadcasting messages is very small, as compared to
the total number of transmitted messages by processors. Therefore, we believe that
I2SEMS is scalable to large systems.
4. Architecture of Keystream Pool and Keystream Cache
Both the keystream pool and the keystream cache have the cache architecture. The
keystream pool size will affect the system performance. If its size is too small, the
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keystream pool hit rate will decrease due to capacity misses, but, if the size is too
big, the long keystream pool access time increases the total decryption time. To
minimize performance slowdown and get a high hit rate at the same time, we will
use the largest possible cache architecture as long as its access time is hidden from
the system cache access. According to CACTI model [44], one cache access consists
of several circuit level delays. The following equation shows that a cache data access
time can be divided into address decoding, wordline, bitline, and sense amplifier time,
which occur sequentially.
Tdata = Tdecode + Twline + Tbline + Tsense (5.2)
Tdecode is the address decoding time to access a specific cache set in the cache. This
stage requires the address only, so we can utilize Tdecode to parallelize accesses to the
system cache and the keystream pool. In other words, if the keystream pool access
time, Taccess(KeystreamPool), is equal to or smaller than the system cache’s address
decoding time, Tdecode(SystemCache) as in Equation 5.3, we can hide the keystream
pool access time. In our experiment, we used a 1M bytes 4-way system cache with
6ns access time. Since its Tdecode is 3ns, we use a 512K bytes 4-way keystream
pool with 3ns access time for the keystream pool, which meets the requirement of
Equation 5.3. The effect of set associativity on the system performance is analyzed in
Section ??. Note that the six clock cycle authentication delay is not considered here.
That is because the authentication is not in the critical path for program execution.
Therefore, I2SEMS issues a lazy authentication fail alert.
Taccess(KeystreamPool) ≤ Tdecode(SystemCache) (5.3)
The high hit rate of the keystream cache will reduce the counter usage effec-
tively. Thus, the design of the keystream cache is tightly related to the scalability
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of I2SEMS. Different from the keystream pool, the keystream cache can utilize the
temporal locality of memory accesses. When a cache block is being shared by multi-
ple processors actively, they are more likely to access the block within a short time
than later. In our simulation, we observed that, as the size of cache increases, the
keystream cache hit rate also increases, but the effect of larger caches is gradually
diminishing. Therefore, we believe in most cases even a small keystream cache can
yield a relatively high hit rate.
D. Secure Communications of I2SEMS
Until now, we proposed an architectural design of I2SEMS and showed how it can
predict and precompute next counters. In this section, we explain how I2SEMS
provides secure communications. First, we discuss how data messages are protected
in detail. Then, we describe methods to protect other messages such as GCC messages
and control messages.
1. Protection on Data Messages
By architectural support of I2SEMS, we can assume that a sender and its receiver
share the same counter. Even if the counter is not correctly predicted in the re-
ceiving node, it will be available soon when the message arrives. Figure 20 shows
how to encrypt a data packet carrying a 32-byte plaintext and generate a message
authentication codes (MAC) using GCM. Decryption has a similar design. Since the
block size of AES is 128 bits, the 32-byte plaintext is divided into two sub-plaintexts,
Plaintext1 and Plaintext2. Larger cache blocks will be divided into more number of
sub-plaintexts. The two plaintexts are encrypted in parallel by XORing with two
keystreams, making two ciphertexts, Ciphertext1 and Ciphertext2. The ciphertexts
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RC || SD || DS || addr
counter0…00
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Ciphertext2
GF_Mult H
MAC
counter0…01 counter0…10
Fig. 20. Galois/counter mode
are concatenated to make 32 bytes encrypted payload. GF MultH denotes mul-
tiplication in GF (2128) using a hash key H, which is the encrypted zero counter,
AES(0128, K), with a secret key K.
• Encryption of Data Message
Since AES is considered to be secure without any serious weakness until now,
the plaintext will be kept secret as long as all input counters of AES are unique for
different data. AESK is hardware implementation of AES algorithm with a secket key,
K. Note that in Figure 20 one 64-bit global counter is used to compose three 128-bit
counters to generate three different keystreams. In this example, I2SEMS appends
three different prefixes: 06200, 06201, and 06210, by using the 62-bit common prefix. If
the 64-bit counter is globally unique and all components including processors and the
memory share the same 62-bit common prefix, every counter used as an input of AES
is unique in the whole system. With regard to the uniqueness of the 64-bit global
counter, we already described how I2SEMS can accomplish it in the previous section.
Secure sharing of secrets like the common prefix was fully investigated in [112], so
we can assume that I2SEMS can share the common prefixes securely. To prevent
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the global counter from starting with the same number at every booting stage, the
common prefix will be increased by one, and distributed securely to all processors
and the memory.
The last concern of confidentiality of data messages is counter-wrap-around. If
the 64-bit global counter wraps around, two different data blocks will use the same
keystream. We estimate the expected wrap-around time by considering the maximum
counter usage rate of a system. Let’s suppose a system has 26 processors using a 3.2G
bytes/sec network and a 32 byte-long message and counter is 64 bits long. When one
half of the processors keep sending modified cache blocks at its full speed and the other
half are receiving them, this system will consume 232 keystreams per second, thus
taking about 27 years to wrap around the counter in the worst case. Considering that
I2SEMS assigns new counters only when necessary, we expect the actual counter wrap
around time will be far longer than the estimation. Therefore, the 64-bit counter will
be big enough to support system lifetime of fairly large multiprocessor systems. Even
if a huge multiprocessor system runs for exceptionally long period of time enough to
reach its theoretical wrap-around-time, the system can be simply. Therefore, I2SEMS
can protect data messages from eavesdropping attacks trying to recover all or partial
information of plaintexts.
• Authentication of Data Message
Since the security strength of GCM is the same as the strength of its block cipher
[23], the authentication strength is greatly improved. Owing to this, any modification
and spoofing attack will not be successful because the hacker does not know the secret
key K. Additionally, the source node (SN) and destination node (DN) addresses are
input of GF MultH , so the redirection attack is not possible, either.
The last authentication concern is replay attacks on data messages. According
to why a data message transfer is necessary, there are different replay attack scenarios
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Fig. 21. Data messages transfer
as shown in Figure 21. The first relay attack point is on data messages between two
L2 caches, which are numbered as a1,a2, and a3. When an L2 cache read miss occurs
in C1 and its authoritative copy is stored in other L2 cache, C2, a read request (a1)
is delivered to C2. C2 sends the requested block (a2) to C1, and then C1 sends an
acknowledgement message (a3) to C2. A possible replay attack is as follows. Suppose
a hacker captures two messages a1 and a2 for a specific address. Later, if C1 evicts
the cache block and needs it again, C1 will send a new request a
′
1 to C2 with the same
address. The hacker can drop a′1, replay a2 to C1, and drop a new acknowledgement
a′3. This attack will be successful because a2 has a correct MAC with the same node
addresses and memory address. To prevent this attack, we propose that every read
request from an L2 cache should need to carry a unique sequential number, referred to
as Request Counter (RC). Whenever a read request is sent out, the RC is increased
and attached to the request message. In the above example, a1 will carry RCC1 . C2
includes RCC1 in generation of its MAC. This is why the first input of GF MultH
is RCC1 ‖ SN ‖ DS ‖ addr. Let’s look at the replay attack again. a
′
1 will carry a
new RC, RC ′C1 that is different from RCC1 used in a1. The authentication of replayed
a2 will not be successful because C1 expects an MAC generated with RC
′
C1
‖ SN ‖
DS ‖ addr but the replayed a2 carries an MAC generated with RCC1 ‖ SN ‖ DS
95
‖ addr. Since C1 keeps increasing RCC1 per memory request, no two RCC1 will be
the same within its wrap-around-time. To estimate the wrap-around-time of RC,
we need to fix the number of nodes and the size of memory. Suppose there are 26
processors and the memory size is 28 GB. Since | SN | is 6 bits, | addr | is 38 bits,
and the input width of GF MultH is 128 bits, | RC | can be 78 bits. Even if RC’s
width is 59 bits and a cache keeps sending 32-bits messages using a new RC in a 3.2
Gbytes/sec network, its wrap-around-time is approximately 27 years like that of the
global counter. Thus, the first 19 bits can be used as a prefix that is incremented by
one at the booting stage as we did for the global counter. After 219 rebootings, we
can see the same RC from the same cache, which will be almost impossible to happen
in real systems. Therefore, our scheme can prevent replay attacks on data message
between caches.
The second relay attack point is on data messages from the memory to an L2
cache, which are numbered as b1,b2, and b3. When C1 wants to access the memory
for read, a memory request is delivered to the memory (b1). The memory sends the
requested block (b2), and then C1 sends an acknowledgement message to the memory
(b3). Since communication steps are exactly the same as those between two caches,
replay attack scenario and its prevention are also the same.
The third replay attack point is on data messages from an L2 cache to the
memory. The transfer happens when a modified block is evicted from the cache and
written back to the memory. This replay attack is different from the two previous
attacks because there will no read request such as a1 and b1. C2 directly sends a
write-back request with data (c1) in Figure 21. A possible replay attack is as follows.
Suppose a hacker captured c1 for a specific address. Then, the hacker can recover the
old data anytime by replaying c1. Since c
′
2 will also be dropped, the attack will go
unnoticed by cache coherence protocols. To prevent this replay attack, we insert the
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RC in the request as well as use RC to make an MAC. That is, C2 use RCC2 ‖ SN
‖ DS ‖ addr for its MAC, and c1 carries RCC2 . The memory should remember each
cache’s last RC so that it can raise a security alert when an arriving RC is smaller
than or equal to the last RC. Therefore, I2SEMS prevents the replay attacks on data
messages.
For the complete protection of memory, we additionally adopt Merkle tree or a
recently proposed Bonsai Merkle tree [65, 113]. Even though it is out of our research
scope, Merkle tree can prevent memory authentication attacks like memory block
replacements. Note that since I2SEMS prevents replay attacks, we can ease a hard
requirement of Merkle tree authentication that a root authentication code needs to be
stored in processor/cache that is assumed to be secure. In our design, as long as the
secure memory controller can store the root authentication code, making sure that
the memory contents are not modified or replaced through physical attacks, I2SEMS
can guarantee secure communications between caches and memory. This will remove
possible overhead for updating the root authentication codes in multiple processor
systems at every memory writing.
Until now, we implicitly assumed that the underlying general interconnect pro-
vides in-order delivery and there is no packet loss because we simply compared the
most recent RC and a newly arrived RC. In larger multiprocessor systems, however,
out-of-order delivery and message loss are possible. For example, two invalidation
requests from the same node to the same destination node can arrive out of order
by taking different paths in adaptive routing schemes, meaning the smaller RC can
arrive later. The strict requirement of monotonic increasing RC will not be working
in out-of-order delivery interconnects. Note that, however, the replay attack will be
only successful when a hacker sends exactly same copies of previous messages, which
means that the replayed message’s RC already arrived before. In other words, out-
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of-order delivery will cause skipped numbers in received RC while replay attacks will
result in duplication among received RCs. For this, each cache needs to maintain his-
tory information of other caches’ RC. The maximum delay of out-of-order delivery
and message retransimission time will decide the size of the storage. Since most mul-
tiprocessor systems provide highly reliable interconnects, it seems less likely to have
a larger number of out-of-order or lost messages for long period of time. Therefore,
the space overhead of the stoage will be small.
2. Protection on Control Messages
Control messages like invalidation or write requests need appropriate protection for
the follwoing reason. In Figure 21, suppose that C2 is an exclusive owner of a cache
block of an address. A hacker spoofs a write request with C1 as the source node
and C2 as the destination node. C2 would invalidate its block by understanding that
C1 wants to have an owenership to overwrite the block. This attack results in cache
incoherence because the cache coherence protocol considers C2 as the owner of the
address, but C2 already invalidated the block. For this, we propose to authenticate
control messages by using local counters. Each cache has its own 64-bit counter and
increases it by one at every control message. This local counter instead of the global
counter is used as an input of AESK in Figure 20. Since there is no data to encrypt,
Plantext1 and Plantext2 will be simply 0
128. Instead, two ciphertexts will be used
only for generation of MAC. Still, the input of GF MultH is RC ‖ SN ‖ DS ‖
addr, and the message needs to carry RC. Like the global counter, the local counter
will be initialized at every booting stage to prevent every local counter from starting
with the same number. Note that we do not consider performance implication of
authentication of control messages. That is because we can presume this will not cause
significant performance overhead by using the combination of local counter prediction
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and speculative authentication. As we did in the global counter, each cache can
predict the next local counter and precompute its keystream so that it can instantly
generate incoming control message’s MAC. According to [67], there is a temporal
locality in cache coherence communications, meaning that a cache communicates
with relatively small number of caches at a time. Therefore, the prediction hit rate
is expected to be very high. Furthermore, in case of a local counter miss, which
could incur an authentication delay, we use authentication speculation. In other
words, when a keystream to authenticate a control message is not available, instead
of waiting for the generation of the keystream, the receiving cache simply checks
RC first, and then process the control message as requested. Considering that the
authentication will be successful when there is no security attack, the authentication
of control messages will not affect the overall performance.
3. Protection on Counter Messages
Since the whole security mechanism depends on the counters assigned by the GCC,
the protection of the GCC and its counter distribution is critical. Therefore, the
GCC itself needs to be tamper-resistant so that its operation and secret keys will be
protected. So, we need to provide appropriate protection on the counter messages.
to remove any possibility of modifying, forging, or replaying attacks,
First of all, counters carried on counter messages need authentication only, not
encryption, because even if the counter is available to a hacker he cannot generate
or predict any keystreams without knowing a secket key in use. For authenticating
counter messages, we propose a new counter, GCC Counter (GC), similar to the
local counter in protection of control messages. When a keystream queue needs more
global counters, it sends a counter request with an RC to prevent a possible replay
attack on counter request and reply messages. Upon a counter request, the GCC first
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makes a reply message to the requester. The input of AESK uses GC, Plaintext1 is
a new global counter, Plaintext2 is zero, and the input of the input of GF MultH
is RC ‖ GCC ‖ DS. Then, the GCC makes a broadcast message to all keystream
pools. The input of AESK uses GC + 1, Plaintexts are the same, and the input
of the input of GF MultH is GCC ‖ ∗. * is a special character for a broadcasting
address. The GCC increases GC by two for next counter requests. A replay attack
on counter broadcast messages does not look interesting to a hacker since it will end
up with broadcasting an old counter that can be simply dropped by comparing the
arriving global counter and the most recent global counter. Out-of-order delivery
interconnects may allow a broadcast message to arrive earlier than its reply message
or its previous broadcast messages. In the former case, the cache keeps waiting for
a reply message by discarding the broadcast message. In the latter case, if there is
skipped global counters in the broadcasted messages, keystream pools assume that
out-of-order delivery or packet loss happens, so it can precompute all the global
counters’ keystreams including the skipped counters. With regard to performance of
authentication of GCC messages, keystream queues and keystream pools authenticate
most GCC messages with little delay by correctly predicting GC because the GCC
keeps broadcasting GC to all processors.
E. Performance Analysis
1. Simulation Framework
Simulator: We evaluate the performance of I2SEMS by using the Simics full-system
multiprocessor simulator developed by Virtutech AB [107]. To simulate general shared
memory systems and various cache coherence protocols, we use GEMS as an ex-
tension of Simics [108]. We developed I2SEMS in four cache coherence protocols:
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Table V. Processor model parameters
Parameters Values
CPU 1 GHz
L1 I-Cache 128K bytes, 4-way, 2ns latency
L1 D-Cache 128K bytes, 4-way, 2ns latency
L2 Cache 1M bytes, 4-way, 6ns latency
Cache Block Size 32 bytes
Keystream Pool 512K bytes, 4-way, 3ns latency
Keystream Cache 32-entry fully associative, 2ns latency
Memory 2G bytes, 80ns
network link bandwidth 3.2G bytes/sec
AES latency 80ns
AES throughput 3.2G bytes/sec
broadcasting, directory, hammer, and token. Broadcasting and directory coherence
protocols are traditional protocols used in current shared memory multiprocessor
systems. Hammer cache coherence protocol is an approximation of AMD’s Hammer
protocol used in AMD multiprocessor systems [114]. Token coherence protocol re-
cently proposed by Martin, et al. is a low latency cache coherence protocol enabled
by decoupling performance and correctness [103].
Configuration: We configured Simics as a Sun Fire server with UltraSPARCIII+
processors and Solaris 9 OS using the parameters shown in Table V. Since the decod-
ing time of the unified L2 cache is approximately 3ns, we use 512K bytes keystream
pools with 3ns access time to parallelize a keystream pool access with an L2 cache
access. The keystream cache is 32-entry fully associative cache with 2ns hit latency.
Due to the recent development of AES implementation, a 128 bit AES unit can pro-
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duce 30∼70 Gbps using 0.18µm CMOS technology. In our experiment, default AES
latency is 80ns and throughput is 3.2G bytes/sec [62, 13, 43]. CR is calculated to be
32. We configured the network using hierarchical switches with fanout degree of 4,
which is default in GEMS [108]. Since in our simulation the network latency to trans-
mit a 32 bytes cache block is 10ns, the six clock cycle delay for GF multiplications
discussed in Chapter II can be overlapped without causing an additional delay.
Benchmarks: We used four SPLASH-2 benchmarks; FFT, LU, RADIX, and
OCEAN with their typical settings as described in [110] and one SpecOMP2001
benchmark, APPLU.
2. Overall Performance Slowdown
We ran five benchmark programs using two secure configurations and one non-secure
configuration; one secure configuration is I2SEMS and the other is prediction only
scheme to compare with I2SEMS. Similar to Counter mode proposed by Shi, et al.
[62], the prediction only scheme has a keystream generator and a small number of
keystream buffers. Regardless of a keystream pool hit or miss, the keystream gen-
erator keeps generating p keystreams by using the next counters. We assume that,
in the prediction only scheme, each cache controller knows its own exclusive range of
counters.
Figure 22 (a) shows the overall performance slowdown normalized to the execu-
tion time of the non-secure configuration. As compared to the baseline configuration
with no security measures, I2SEMS incurs around 4 percent performance slowdown
on average. It is clear that I2SEMS causes less performance slowdown than the pre-
diction only scheme. However, it is hard to find a common trend in performance
slowdown among varying number of processors. That is possibly because the execu-
tion time can be easily affected by other factors. Since we use the non-deterministic
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Fig. 22. Overall performance.
full-system architectural simulator and multithreaded workloads, the execution path
of each benchmark program is not always the same. Thus, a small difference in the
selection of OS scheduling may cause large variability in the execution time. The
similar effect was discussed by Zhang, et al. [13]. Instead, we use the keystream pool
hit rate for performance comparison not only because it is less variable than execution
time, but also because the high hit rate is positively correlated with performance.
Figure 22 (b) shows keystream pool hit rates of five benchmark programs. The hit
rates vary from 22 percent to 78 percent, but note that in all benchmarks I2SEMS has
higher hit rates than the prediction only scheme. This is because the prediction and
broadcast schemes adaptively yield a high keystream pool hit rate in both memory-
read and memory-write dominant applications.
We would like to emphasize that the counter prediction of a uniprocessor system
is completely different from that of multiprocessor systems. According to [62], unipro-
cessor’s prediction scheme showed 82 percent keystream hit rate and optimization
techniques can increase the rate even up to 99 percent. However, in our simulation,
the prediction only scheme shows a lower keystream pool hit rate. This is because the
counter in the uniprocessor system will be highly contiguous, so the sequential predic-
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tion is very likely to be correct. However, in the prediction only scheme, the exclusive
counters would result in counters’ discontinuity in adjacent cache blocks when those
blocks are modified by multiple processors having different counter ranges. There-
fore, it is unavoidable to have a high miss rate, especially in data sharing intensive
applications. In contrast, our scheme will show a high prediction hit rate in both high
and low data sharing situations because the high hit rate of I2SEMS comes from not
only the counter prediction but also the counter broadcast.
3. Keystream Pool Size
To investigate the effect of the keystream pool size and associativity on the keystream
pool hit rate, we varied the keystream pool size from 64K bytes to 512K bytes with
direct-mapped, 2-way, and 4-way set associativities. In Figure 23, as the size increases,
keystream pool hit rates also increase. It is intuitive that a large cache can hold more
keystreams and consequently yield a higher keystream pool hit rate. Note that, even
after the keystream pool size is increased exponentially, the keystream pool hit rate
does not go up dramatically, ranging from 5 percent to 20 percent. The reason is
that the recently assigned or predicted keystreams are more likely to be hit. Cache
set associativity does not have a substantial effect on the keystream pool hit rate. A
high set associative cache is useful only when many blocks are mapped to the same
set. However, the counter itself is increasing monotonically, so cache contentions do
not occur often. Therefore, we conclude that, in the presence of area and power
constraints, the direct-mapped keystream pool is more desirable.
4. Cache Coherence Protocol
We investigate the relationship between the keystream pool hit rate and cache co-
herence protocols. In Figure 24, to illustrate individual contributions, we show the
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Fig. 23. Hit rate vs. keystream pool size and associativity.
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Fig. 24. Keystream origination.
breakdown of keystream hit rate according to their origination: Broadcast and Predic-
tion. We observe that, in both graphs, the proportion of hits on broadcasted counters
is increasing as the number of processors is increasing. Therefore, we can conclude
that a memory-writing dominant application will have a high keystream pool hit rate.
However, even in a memory-reading dominant application, its keystream pool hit rate
will not drop sharply because read-only memory accesses usually show high locality
of memory accesses, and consequently the prediction scheme will contribute to a high
keystream pool hit rate more than the broadcast scheme. Therefore, I2SEMS will
show good performance irrespective of memory access patterns in large multiproces-
sor systems.
5. Prediction Depth
The prediction depth is the number of keystreams that a keystream pool generates
upon an arrival of a message. To investigate the impact of deep prediction depth on
the keystream pool hit rate, we increased the prediction depth up to 160, testing on up
to 16-processor systems as depicted in Figure 25. As the prediction depth increases,
both the keystream pool hit rate and its prediction portion gradually increase while
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Fig. 25. Hit rate vs. prediction depth.
the broadcast portion slightly decreases. This is mainly because as the number of
predicted keystreams increases, previously precomputed broadcast keystreams are
evicted from the keystream pool. Note that, however, when the prediction depth
reaches 160, the overall keystream hit rate begins to decrease. Therefore, this result
shows that too deep prediction will have a negative impact on the performance from
some points, and that, even with deep prediction, the broadcast scheme contributes
substantially to the overall keystream pool hit rate.
6. Scalability of Global Counter Controller
Figure 26 shows the simulation results of RADIX benchmark using up to 16 proces-
sors. Figure 26 (a) shows that the keystream cache hit rate will be relatively high
even with the small keystream cache. This is due to the locality of memory accesses.
Figure 26 (b) illustrates how much a 32-entry keystream cache reduces the counter
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usage. When the number of processors is two, less than 3 percent of outgoing data
blocks reuse keystreams, but in the 16 processors the rate reaches around 25 per-
cent. Considering the rate is going up rapidly as the number of processors increases,
it is expected that a significant portion of outgoing messages will reuse keystreams.
In Figure 26 (c), while the number of normal messages increases dramatically at 16
processors, the number of GCC messages does not change proportionally, but even
appears static. This is because our scheme successfully reduces the number of new
counters through the keystream reuse by using both the keystream cache and the
block assignment of new counters. Although simulation results are only available in
up to 16 processors, the trend hints that the GCC will be scalable to larger shared
memory multiprocessor systems.
F. Conclusions
In this study, we proposed I2SEMS to guarantee confidentiality and integrity of shared
memory and cache-to-cache communication in multiprocessor systems by incorporat-
ing a small amount of additional hardware components: GCC, keystream queue,
keystream cache, and keystream pool. The GCC assigns globally unique counters for
memory/cache-to-cache communication security. Keystream queues and keystream
caches minimize encryption delay while reducing the counter usage rate. For fast
decryption, keystream pools precompute/store keystreams at a counter broadcast by
the GCC as well as at a message arrival. In addition, by separating security im-
plementation and cache coherence verification, I2SEMS can work on diverse cache
coherence protocols.
The important conclusions of this work are the following: First, we provided
confidentiality and integrity of shared memory and cache-to-cache communication in
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multiprocessor systems with low performance overhead. We used GCM with AES for
better security and performance. The performance overhead of I2SEMS was 4 percent
on average although execution time was too variable to find a common trend. The
keystream pool hit rate was as high as 78 percent, meaning 78 percent of incoming
messages were instantly decrypted and authenticated upon arrival. Second, simula-
tion results showed that I2SEMS will have good performance in large scale shared
memory multiprocessor systems. Even though we tested up to 16-processors due
to the current status of our simulator, its trend looks obvious. In addition, I2SEMS
works well with any applications. If an application is memory-read dominant, the pre-
diction scheme where subsequent counters are predicted will contribute significantly
to a high keystream pool hit rate because of the high locality of memory access.
In memory-write dominant applications, the broadcast scheme where newly assigned
counters are broadcasted will increase the keystream pool hit rate. Therefore, we
conclude that I2SEMS can support large scale shared memory multiprocessors with
diverse memory access patterns. Note that, due to the limitation of the simulator, we
could not simulate distributed shared memory systems. Nevertheless, we believe gen-
eral trends will be similar not only because the number of GCC-related messages will
be still very small, but also because both the prediction scheme and counter broadcast
scheme will result in high keystream pool hit rates. Third, we found that relatively
small keystream pools can support a large system although the larger keystream pools
are beneficial to the high keystream pool hit rate. Set associativity does not have
much impact on the keystream pool hit rate. Therefore, a simple but moderate sized
keystream pool is desirable in I2SEMS.
We are currently examining a number of possible expansions to this work. First,
we were unable to analyze the realistic web-based or database servers. In-depth
experiments with those server applications should fortify the I2SEMS design. Next,
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we would like to expand our research to much larger multiprocessor systems with
DSM and to new multiprocessor architectures such as Chip Multiprocessor (CMP)
systems.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed three major topics in this dissertation. These are (i) study of a
secure cluster design that is robust to confidentiality, authentication, and availability
attacks, (ii) study of a security accelerating network interface card that can improve
security performance significantly by oﬄoading security operations from host proces-
sors, (iii) design of interconnect-independent secure shared-memory multiprocessor
systems protecting the inter-processor communications from confidentiality attacks.
In the first study, we elaborated on the Key exposure problem of InfiniBand-
based cluster systems and showed that possible DoS attacks can affect the overall
performance significantly. Then, we detailed how to adopt an encryption and au-
thentication algorithm into IBA clusters with as low as 0.7% performance overhead.
We also proposed the stateful ingress filtering that can be active only when neces-
sary. Furthermore, our source identification algorithm can trace back real attackers
in large networks regardless of their topologies. In the second study, we focused on
enabling fine-grained secure communications in coscheduled cluster systems with low
performance overhead. For this, we proposed a small session key cache and a prefetch
buffer inside cluster interconnect card and showed that SKC is very effective when
communication patterns show high temporal locality. To estimate the size of SKC, we
developed an analytical model. This model showed that a 16-Kbyte SKC can support
large-scale cluster systems with a high hit rate. In the third study, we proposed a
secure shared-memory multiprocessor systems called I2SEMS. To provide confiden-
tiality and integrity of shared memory and cache-to-cache communication, I2SEMS
has a small amount of additional hardware components: GCC, keystream queue,
keystream cache, and keystream pool. Simulation results showed that I2SEMS will
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show good performance in providing large scale shared memory multiprocessor sys-
tems with better security using GCM and AES. Its performance overhead is around
4 percent with as high as 78 percent keystream hit rate.
We are currently examining a number of possible extensions to this work. They
include secure cluster design for other cluster interconnects by extending ideas used
in secure IBA cluster system. We plan to implement secure NIC design by using a re-
configurable NIC. By doing this, we can get more practical analysis of its performance
impact on performance of cluster systems. Finally, we are exploring alternative secure
multiprocessor designs in various multi-processor or -core architecture.
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